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LABOR LAW, NEW GOVERNANCE,
AND THE GHENT SYSTEM*
MATTHEW DIMICK**
The Employee Free Choice Act ("EFCA") was the most
significant legislation proposed for reforming the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") in over a generation and the
centerpiece of the American labor movement's revitalization
strategy. Yet, the EFCA hewed closely to the particular
regulatory model established by the NLRA at the peak of the
New Deal, now over seventy-five years ago. Further, recent
scholarship suggests that traditional regulatory approaches are
giving way to new kinds of governance methods for addressing
social problems. Rather than reviving an old regulatory model,
should "New Governance" approaches instead be sought for
addressing problems in employment representation? Through a
comparative legal and institutional analysis, this Article offers a
novel study of an alternative governance approach in labor and
employment law by exploring the Ghent system.
The Ghent system is a voluntary system of unemployment
insurance in which labor unions administer publicly subsidized
insurance funds and, along with employers and the state,
participate in unemployment insurance policymaking. The
Ghent system helps overcome three separate problems in
collective employment relations that existing labor law in the
United States attempts to resolve in evidently ineffective ways,
which the EFCA had sought to reform. First, the Ghent system
encourages employers to recognize and bargain with unions by
providing workers with incentives to join labor unions prior to
and independent of the employers' recognition of the union.
Second, voluntary, union-administered unemployment insurance
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provides an alternative "selective incentive" that reduces free
riding on collective union goods. Finally, union and employer
collaboration in unemployment insurance policy generates
efficiency gains that underwrite cooperative labor relations and
reduce employer resistance and workplace adversarialism. In
exchange for generous unemployment benefits, unions yield on
employment-protection rules, giving employers more flexibility
in the workplace-a bargain referred to as "flexicurity." The
Article concludes by drawing policy lessons from the Ghent
system analysis. A "progressive-federalist" strategy of
unemployment insurance reform at the state level may be more
feasible than federal labor law reform because of the broad
deference states enjoy under the federal Social Security Act, but
non-legislative lessons can also be applied, as several
contemporary and U.S. examples illustrate.
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INTRODUCTION
Labor unions held great aspirations with the victory of Barack
Obama in the 2008 presidential election. At the top of their legislative
agenda was the Employee Free Choice Act ("EFCA"), by far the
most significant proposal for reforming American labor law in over a
generation.' Having devoted vast economic and political resources to
its passage, the organized labor movement considered the EFCA its
central revitalization strategy.2 However, like many of the other
hopes that progressives held for the early Obama Administration, the
EFCA succumbed to the maelstrom of bitter partisan politics.' The
fate of the EFCA is grim news for labor movement advocates. If a
simple reform bill cannot pass-envisioning no fundamental change
to the basic structure of the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA"), merely "filling gaps" in the current framework-what
hope is there for revitalizing the labor movement?4 Yet precisely as a
gap-filling measure, the EFCA hews closely to the NLRA's New Deal
"regulatory" model. The irony is that the EFCA arrived at a time
when both recent scholarship and experience suggest that the New
Deal model of regulation is being supplanted by new forms of public
responses to social problems, labeled broadly as "governance." 5
1. The last major attempt at reforming the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA"), which failed, occurred with the proposed Labor Law Reform Act of 1977.
H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 123 CONG. REc. 23,711-14 (1977); S. 1883, 95th Cong., 123 CONG.
REC. 23,738 (1977). A history of the bill is given in 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 71-
73 (John E. Higgins, Jr. et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006).
2. Jane McAlevey, Making Unions Matter Again, NATION (N.Y.C.), Dec. 20, 2010, at
12, 13 ("Encouraged by pollsters and Democratic Party consultants, union leaders decided
to bet the farm on the [EFCA]. With the economic crisis ravaging the nation, this was the
number-one 'ask' of the new administration labor had fought so hard (and paid so dearly)
to elect.").
3. Steven Mikulan, Op-Ed., Labor's Love Lost, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7,2011, http://www
.latimes.comlnews/opinion/commentary/la-oe-mikulan-labor-20110207,0,5224608.story
(reporting that the EFCA is "fatally stalled").
4. David Brody, A Tale of Two Labor Laws, DISSENT (N.Y.C.), Spring 2010, at 63,
67 ("The [EFCA] bill made no pretense at rethinking the law. All it did was patch up the
holes.").
5. See generally Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004) (synthesizing
and providing a broad overview of the literature addressing "new governance" and
contemporary approaches to regulation).
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Rather than allocating scarce political and financial resources to
reviving the NLRA's regulatory framework, should the labor
movement instead be searching for "New Governance" models to
address the pressing problem of workplace representation?
The distinction between regulation and governance has received
much attention in recent legal scholarship.6 It is perhaps most
associated with research in administrative law,7 but it has also
extended into corporate law' and, more recently, labor and
employment law.9 As a matter of definition, the distinction
encompasses a variety of valences. "Regulation" evokes prescriptive
rules, substantive prohibitions, coercive enforcement, and an
adversarial relationship between regulating and regulated entities.' °
At the extreme, regulation conjures the image of state-based, top-
down, and "command-and-control" forms of managing social
problems."
"Governance," in contrast, involves a more collaborative or
cooperative relationship between regulating and regulated entities, 2
6. See, e.g., infra notes 7-9.
7. See generally David A. Dana, The New "Contractarian" Paradigm in
Environmental Regulation, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 35 (describing an alternative to traditional
regulation wherein regulators reduce enforcement in exchange for the regulated entities'
agreement to additional obligations that exceed the requirements of existing law); Daniel
A. Farber, Revitalizing Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1278 (1993) (discussing, in the
context of environmental regulation, the "contractarian" approach in which regulators and
regulated entities negotiate obligations); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997) (proposing a new model of collaborative
governance as an alternative to "adversarial administrative decision-making"); Richard B.
Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. REV. 86 (1986) (discussing the use of
"reconstitutive" strategies as an alternative to the extreme choices between centralized
regulation and deregulation).
8. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal
Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 21, 23 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds.,
2004).
9. See generally CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE (2010)
[hereinafter ESTLUND, REGOVERNING] (exploring methods for strengthening employee
rights and labor standards within self-regulatory regimes); Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the
Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (2005)
[hereinafter Estlund, Rebuilding] (same); Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and
Industrial Relations: The Governance of Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071 (2005)
(arguing for the expansion of "governance-based policies" in the context of workplace
safety); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001) (arguing that a governance-based approach
could address employment discrimination not captured by traditional regulation).
10. See Lobel, supra note 5, at 343-45 (describing the regulatory paradigm).
11. Id.
12. Id.
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as well as a more "reflexive"13 or "experimentalist"14 approach to
developing rules and standards. More in the spirit of this Article's
usage, "governance" is also used to refer to ways of influencing
behavior "indirectly, either by enhancing [actors'] power or by
molding [their] incentives."' 5 In the administrative law context,
incentive molding might take the form of "monitored self-
regulation," where the regulated entity is encouraged to adopt
internal compliance mechanisms and is rewarded with less
interventionist forms of oversight. 16 In corporate law, incentive
shaping might include shareholder rights to appoint directors, as
opposed to direct regulation of managerial decision making or, more
broadly, a "pay-for-performance" compensation contract that aligns a
manager's incentives with shareholder interests.17 Until now, research
has imagined what governance would look like in the labor and
employment law context only by analogy to administrative law or
monitored self regulation. 8 This Article proposes a different model
of labor and employment governance. This model is found in
countries that employ the Ghent system of unemployment insurance.
Named after the Belgian town where it was first instituted, the
Ghent system is a voluntary system of unemployment insurance
where funds are administered by labor unions but supervised through
legislation and subsidized with public finances. 9 This Article conducts
a comparative legal and institutional analysis of the United States,
Denmark, and Sweden, countries where the fortunes of labor unions
have differed markedly during the recent decades of globalization
and workplace reorganization. Unlike the United States, which relies
on a regulatory model, Denmark and Sweden feature the Ghent
system. This Article's thesis is that the Ghent system ameliorates
some central problems in the collective representation of employee
interests, not prescriptively through the elaboration of detailed rules
13. STATE, LAW AND ECONOMY AS AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEMS: REGULATION AND
AUTONOMY IN A NEW PERSPECTIVE 11-13 (Gunther Teubner & Alberto Febbrajo eds.,
1992).
14. See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (identifying a new form of decentralized
government, labeled "democratic experimentalism," that combines decentralized
implementation- to take advantage of local knowledge and individual circumstances, as
well as centralized coordination for setting "best-practice standards" and sharing
information across localities).
15. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 8, at 23.
16. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 106--08 (1995).
17. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 8, at 26-27.
18. See, e.g., ESTLUND, REGOVERNING, supra note 9, at 48-51.
19. See infra Part I.A.
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and their coercive enforcement, but indirectly by molding the
incentives of workers, unions, and employers.
There are three fundamental dilemmas that occur in collective
employment representation." These are labeled the recognition
problem, the free-rider problem, and the adversarial problem. Where
the NLRA and EFCA have proffered a regulatory solution to each
problem, the Ghent system offers a governance alternative.
Perhaps the most pressing problem in employment
representation, and the one to which the EFCA was addressed, is the
recognition problem.2' A familiar rationale for collective
representation of employee interests is that unions produce collective
goods that are likely to be underprovided in the market. To provide
these goods to their members, however, unions must first be
recognized by and be able to bargain with firms over terms and
conditions of employment. Currently, the NLRA seeks to ensure that
employees have a choice about union representation. While the
default rule is that workers are not represented by a union, the
NLRA seeks to minimize employer interference and resistance when
employees express a preference for union representation. It does so
by providing for representation elections to determine employee
support, protecting employees from discrimination on the basis of
union support or opposition, and establishing a duty for employers to
bargain with a union if employees have voted for representation.
Both the EFCA and recent scholarship have sought to address
deficiencies in the free exercise of employee choice by proposing
rules and processes, including the stiffening of sanctions for
prohibited behavior, that mitigate the impediments to departure from
the nonunion default. By contrast, the Ghent system works not by
changing the representation default rule or through government-
supervised procedures, but by molding incentives. Union-provided,
publicly funded unemployment insurance encourages workers to
become union members, and it is from the accumulation of members
and their resources that unions in Denmark and Sweden are able to
sustain recognition from employers without any government-
supervised election process.
Collective employment representation also faces a free-rider
problem.22 Given the collective nature of the goods they produce,
unions always face the danger that workers will "free ride" on these
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part II.A.
22. See infra Part II.B.
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benefits and not join the union or otherwise fail to bear their fair
share of the costs of their production. Under the NLRA, statutorily
authorized and regulated union-security agreements provide a
"negative" incentive for workers to avoid free riding by obligating
them to financially support the union as a condition of continued
employment. By contrast, in Denmark and Sweden, voluntary, union-
provided unemployment insurance (from which nonparticipants are
easily excluded) gives workers a "positive" incentive to join and
remain in the labor union. Workers are not required to join the union
when enrolling in an insurance plan, though the fact that unions
administer the funds undoubtedly encourages workers to do so.
Finally, there is an adversarial problem. Parties will choose to
exit a relationship when the joint gains from it are less than what each
party can get outside of it.23 Similarly, an employer will be less
resistant to unionization when presence of a union can enhance the
employer's productive efficiency or at least minimize any
inefficiencies the union may cause. Hence, trust and cooperation are
more likely to prevail when joint gains are larger, while resistance and
adversarialism will result when those gains are smaller. While the
NLRA's regulatory framework was supposed to channel and contain
"industrial strife" in employment relations, employer antipathy
toward unions and union-employer intransigence in collective
bargaining are the hallmarks of the U.S. system. Union participation
in unemployment insurance policy promotes cooperative employment
relations by generating efficiencies that reduce employer hostility. In
Denmark in particular, unions and employers are able to achieve a
positive-sum tradeoff by exchanging income security for employment
flexibility. While workers receive generous unemployment insurance
benefits, unions cede their demands for job security, which gives
employers more flexibility in the workplace. Danish success with the
policy-termed "flexicurity"-has garnered much attention from
European policymakers 4 This Article contends that union-employer
agreements over wages and unemployment insurance, as produced
under the Ghent system, are more efficient than agreements over
wages and employment protection rules. 25
23. See infra Part II.C.
24. EUROPEAN COMM'N DIRECTORATE-GEN. FOR EMP'T, SOC. AFFAIRS AND
EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES, EMPLOYMENT IN EUROPE 2006, at 3 (2006), available at http://
digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=intl.
25. The emphasis on the Ghent system does not suggest that it is the only institution
available for resolving these dilemmas in Denmark and Sweden. As will be recognized in
Part II.A.2 infra, differences in the structure of collective bargaining are also important-
2012]
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In addition to the key claim that the Ghent system resolves
important dilemmas by giving actors the appropriate incentives, this
Article has two other descriptive and explanatory goals. First, it
examines and rejects widely held preconceptions about the nature of
labor law in the United States and Scandinavia. While there are great
differences-political and cultural, perceived and real-between the
liberal United States and social-democratic Denmark and Sweden,
the case selection has been made precisely because one would expect
these Scandinavian countries, as apotheoses of the corporatist welfare
state, to exhibit the heavy hand of state-mandated rules and
procedures in labor law.26 By contrast, the United States has typically
been viewed as a laggard in this regard, with the NLRA establishing a
framework that overemphasizes private negotiations between labor
and capital with only a minimal role for the state.27 This Article will
demonstrate that the opposite is true, at least with respect to the three
dilemmas defined above. In Denmark and Sweden, for example,
union-security agreements are virtually nonexistent; government-
supervised and regulated representation elections are entirely absent;
workers rights' to form, join, and assist labor unions are not
significantly more protected than in the United States; and the duty to
bargain is either missing entirely (Denmark) or weaker (Sweden) in
Scandinavian labor law than in the United States.28
A second additional goal of this Article is to disentangle the
relationship between the Ghent system and union density. Union
density is the percentage of union members in a country's
workforce.29 It is a key measure of labor union power and influence,
and the main concern of the American labor movement is to reverse
so important that they deserve fuller and more complete treatment than this Article can
provide. Accordingly, this Article will stress the importance of the independent and
significant effects of the Ghent system.
26. Reinhold Fahlbeck, The Demise of Collective Bargaining in the USA: Reflections
on the Un-American Character of American Labor Law, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
307, 311 (1994) (explaining that "the heavy dose of government intervention in the labor
market that is characteristic of U.S. labor law" would be suited to a country like Sweden).
27. Catherine Fisk, Still "Learning Something of Legislation": The Judiciary in the
History of Labor Law, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 151, 152 (1994) (claiming that the "heart
of American labor law is collective bargaining-the notion, often called voluntarism, that
the conditions of labor are best regulated not by state mandates but by private agreement
between employers and unions").
28. See infra Parts II.A.2 and II.B.2.
29. Jelle Visser, Union Membership Statistics in 24 Countries, MONTHLY LAB. REV.,
Jan. 2006, at 38, 38 ("Union membership, relative to the potential of those eligible to join a
labor union, is the most commonly used 'summary measure' for evaluating the strength of
trade unions.").
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its decades-long decline.30 In the social science literature, the positive,
empirical correlation between the Ghent system and union density is
a well-known and oft-confirmed finding. 31 Less attention has been
directed to identifying the causal mechanisms for why such a
relationship exists.3 2 The literature has emphasized the Ghent
system's solution to the free-rider problem. This Article defends the
hypothesis that the Ghent system raises density by resolving two
other dilemmas: the recognition and adversarial problems.
In addition to these positive claims, the Article draws some
normative conclusions.33 What kinds of policy lessons can American
observers learn from the Ghent system? Here comparability concerns
again present themselves, but the Ghent system is in many ways a
conservative method of allocating unemployment insurance and was
not the first choice of labor movements when unemployment
insurance systems were introduced in the early twentieth century.
More pointedly, the legislative and political constraints on the
passage of Ghent-type legislation may be less binding than current
attempts to reform the NLRA, like the EFCA. Federal labor law has
become "ossified," or impervious to change, both at the federal level
and, because of preemption, at the state level as well.34 Under the
federal Social Security Act, by contrast, the federal government
leaves states with some discretion to determine conditions for
eligibility and the amount and duration of benefits for public
unemployment insurance programs. In states where labor unions hold
more favor and influence, state-level Ghent systems could be adopted
and serve as examples and catalysts for change elsewhere. Such
reforms present the possibility of a "progressive-federalist" strategy
for revitalizing the labor movement.
If in practice political barriers prevent such progressive-federalist
reforms, there is still much to be learned from the Ghent system
30. Union density in 2003 was 78% in Sweden, 70.4% in Denmark, and 12.4% in the
United States. See id. at 45 tbl.3.
31. See infra Part I.B.
32. Understanding these causal mechanisms is crucial for two reasons. First, a theory
can only be empirically validated when it has clear, testable hypotheses; elaborating causal
mechanisms generates these kinds of testable claims. Second, a specification of causal
mechanisms, which allows one to peer into the "black box," provides the kind of close and
detailed knowledge that allows policymakers to design the most effective, context-specific
policy prescriptions. On the role of causal mechanisms in social science generally, see
Peter Hedstr6m & Richard Swedberg, Social Mechanisms: An Introductory Essay, in
SOCIAL MECHANISMS 1-31 (Peter Hedstrom & Richard Swedberg eds., 1998).
33. See infra Part III.
34. The term is from Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law,
102 COLUM. L. REv. 1527, 1530 (2002).
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experience.35 The Ghent system's voluntary and partially privatized
nature draws on principles of voluntarism and self-help that have
been as deeply held by the American labor movement as by Ghent
system trade unions. Indeed, what the success of the Ghent system
really suggests is that unions ought to return to their mutual aid roots,
preferably in ways that solve certain problems for employers as well
as employees. Generalizing from the Ghent system, unions should
aspire to produce and deliver private (i.e., excludable) benefits that
are nevertheless generally available to all workers and whose
provision generates gains for employees and employers alike. This
Article evaluates a series of contemporary, homegrown innovations
that embody this Ghent-type principle, including the Freelancers
Union, the AFL-CIO's Working America program, unions acting as
workforce intermediaries, and worker centers.
Movements in the direction of mutual aid could potentially
transform the labor movement. One of the tragic ironies of the
current situation is that, despite its shrinking proportional influence in
the U.S. workforce, in absolute terms, the labor movement still
possesses considerable human and financial resources.36 To take just
one example, unions have accumulated considerable experience and
assets by administering health and pension benefits.3" Those resources
ought to be consolidated, redirected, and leveraged toward benefiting
the workforce as a whole, regardless of whether employees currently
belong to an exclusively-represented, employer-recognized, and
government-certified bargaining unit. The implications of this
structural shift are profound. It might build in the United States "a
labor movement that is much more dependent on its ties to friends
outside its immediate ranks, more accommodating and inclusive of
diverse membership, and more concerned in general with establishing
itself as the conscience and steward of the broader economy. 3 8
35. See infra Part III.B.
36. Margaret Levi, Organizing Power: The Prospects for an American Labor
Movement, 1 PERSP. ON POL. 45, 47 (2003). On this phenomenon, Ron Blackwell, director
of the AFL-CIO's corporate affairs, stated, "In absolute terms, we are the strongest labor
movement in the world.... Relative to employers, political parties, and governments,
however, we are the weakest labor movement in the industrialized world." Id.
37. JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
LAW 17-20, 27 (3d ed. 2000) (quoting in part Peter Drucker, Pension Fund "Socialism", 42
PUB. INT. 3, 3-6, 44-46 (1976)).
38. Laura Dresser & Joel Rogers, Part of the Solution: Emerging Workforce
Intermediaries in the United States, in GOVERNING WORK AND WELFARE IN A NEW
ECONOMY 266, 289 (Jonathan Zeitlin & David M. Trubek eds., 2003). The use of this
quotation generalizes from a conclusion about the benefit of union and employer
collaboration in worker training programs. See infra Part III.C.
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Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the Ghent
system, including its history, institutional characteristics, and a
summary of the empirical research on the impact of the Ghent system
on union density. Part II conducts a comparative institutional analysis
of U.S. labor law and the Ghent system, which is organized in terms
of the three-part dilemma defined in the introduction. Part III
addresses the normative questions of whether, how, and in what form
the Ghent system or Ghent-type governance principles can be and are
being adopted in the United States.
I. THE GHENT SYSTEM
A. Characteristics and History of the Ghent System
The Ghent system was first instituted in 1901 when the Ghent
municipal authority in Belgium began to subsidize trade union
unemployment insurance programs with public funds.39 Since that
time, the Ghent system has evolved to embody a series of
characteristics that distinguish it from the public and compulsory
unemployment insurance systems found in the United States and
most other developed countries. First, under the Ghent system the
unemployment insurance system is administered by labor unions.
This most frequently takes the form of unions running their own
unemployment insurance funds, which are financially segregated from
other union revenues.' In Denmark and Sweden in 2007, there were
thirty-two and thirty-seven, respectively, different union-run
insurance funds an employee could join, distinguished primarily by
industry or occupation.41
Second, most Ghent systems have a voluntary component. By
comparison, in the United States the unemployment insurance
program is entirely financed with tax revenues, and all workers are
entitled to benefits-hence, it is termed a compulsory system.42
39. BRUCE WESTERN, BETWEEN CLASS AND MARKET 51 (1997).
40. Id. at 51, 55-56. Historically, so-called "labor exchanges" dispensed benefits while
also providing job placement services to workers. Id. at 51-54.
41. Jochen Clasen & Elke Viebrock, Voluntary Unemployment Insurance and Trade
Union Membership: Investigating the Connections in Denmark and Sweden, 37 J. Soc.
POL'Y 433, 439 tbl.3 (2008). The thirty-two Danish funds include one nonunion,
"Christian" unemployment fund, which is open to workers across industrial and
occupational sectors, and three other funds open to workers without regard to
employment or educational background. Id. at 440-41.
42. Id. at 433-35; see also Bo Rothstein, Labor-Market Institutions and Working-Class
Strength, in STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE
2012]
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Employees in the typical Ghent system must actively join an
unemployment insurance plan and make some minimum level of
contributions in order to be eligible to receive benefits in the future.43
Belgium is the exception, where the system is compulsory but benefits
are administered by labor unions. 44 In a voluntary Ghent system,
government-regulated and licensed insurance funds are able to
receive up to ninety-five percent of their financing from the
government, with the balance from voluntary contributions. 45 This
voluntary aspect of the Ghent system might raise a concern about the
share of workers covered or receiving benefits, but in fact Ghent
systems tend to perform better on these scores than comparable
compulsory systems.' This is almost certainly a result of heavy
subsidization of funds by tax revenues, low fees for membership in a
fund, and the generosity of benefits.47
Finally, consistent with the Ghent system's mixed public-private
nature, unions, employer associations, and the state typically
collaborate, in "corporatist" fashion, in determining benefit levels,
eligibility requirements, and other aspects of unemployment
insurance policy.48
ANALYSIS 33, 39-40 (Sven Steinmo et al. eds., 1992) (defining both compulsory and
voluntary unemployment insurance systems).
43. Clasen & Viebrock, supra note 41, at 433-35. In Denmark, for instance, an
employee must be a member of a fund for twelve months in order to be eligible to receive
unemployment benefits. Id. at 439 tbl.3.
44. WESTERN, supra note 39, at 54 tbl.4.1.
45. Clasen & Viebrock, supra note 41, at 439 tbl.3. Swedish union unemployment
funds received ninety-five percent of their financing from government revenues until 2007
when a center-right government passed legislation that substantially increased the balance
from membership fees. See generally Anders Kjellberg, The Swedish Ghent System and
Trade Unions Under Pressure, 15 TRANSFER 481 (2009) (discussing these 2007 changes to
the Swedish Ghent system and their impact on union membership rates).
46. Clasen & Viebrock, supra note 41, at 437-38, 438 tbl.2 (showing that in "2005,
both the coverage ratio (share of workforce included in unemployment insurance) as well
as the benefit ratio (share of unemployed in receipt of unemployment insurance benefits)
were considerably higher in Denmark and Sweden than in Germany or the UK, two
countries with compulsory unemployment insurance schemes").
47. Id. at 438 (explaining that coverage problems under the Ghent system are
"avoided by relatively generous benefits and low direct costs, both of which make
membership in voluntary funds attractive"); see also Kjellberg, supra note 45, at 482
(demonstrating how low fund membership fees increase coverage levels by showing that
participation in union-run unemployment funds has declined with legislated increases in
fund membership fees).
48. Each of the current Ghent countries-Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden-
is considered to be corporatist or to have corporatist elements. Bernhard Ebbinghaus &
Jelle Visser, When Institutions Matter: Union Growth and Decline in Western Europe,
1950-1995, 15 EUR. Soc. REV. 135, 151 tbls.5(a) & 5(b) (1999). Denmark and Sweden
exhibit corporatist participation in unemployment insurance policy. See Jens Blom-
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Soon after the first municipal scheme was established in 1901,
versions of the Ghent system could be found in many European
localities.49 Ghent systems became more centralized when provincial
governments began to subsidize municipal funds.50 The first
nationalized Ghent system appeared in France in 1905, followed by
Norway and Denmark a few years later. 51 The Netherlands (1916),
Finland (1917), Belgium (1920), Switzerland (1924), and Sweden
(1934) each adopted their own national voluntary unemployment
plans over the next three decades.5 2 The Great Depression and
economic crises of the early twentieth century appeared to be
contributing factors in the development of the Ghent system, as
governments came to the rescue of depleted union unemployment
funds with public money."
Other European countries took a different path. Following
Britain's lead, Italy (1919), Austria (1920), Ireland (1923), and
Germany (1927) adopted fully public systems of unemployment
insurance.54 The next development in unemployment insurance
provisions saw the passage of control from unions to the state. Shifts
from union to state control occurred in Norway, the Netherlands,
France, and Switzerland.5" Thus, by the close of the twentieth century,
only four European countries had retained the Ghent system:
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden.5 6
The near triumph of public unemployment insurance over the
Ghent model provokes some interesting observations. As Bruce
Western observes, in most cases the shift from union to state
administration "was less a rejection of union power, than an effort at
comprehensive welfare provision." 7 Moreover, at the time that
Hansen, Organized Interests and the State: A Disintegrating Relationship? Evidence from
Denmark, 39 EUR. J. POL. RES. 391, 398 (2001); Jens Blom-Hansen, Still Corporatism in
Scandinavia? A Survey of Recent Empirical Findings, 23 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 157,
159-60 (2000). While it would be possible to have union participation in unemployment
insurance policy without union administration of benefits, and vice versa, they are
typically found together, as Denmark and Sweden illustrate.
49. WESTERN, supra note 39, at 51.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. (citing Jens Alber, Government Responses to the Challenge of Unemployment
The Development of Unemployment Insurance in Western Europe, in THE DEVELOPMENT
OF WELFARE STATES IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 153 (Peter Flora & Arnold J.
Heidenheimer eds., 1981)).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 52.
55. Id. at 52-53.
56. Id. at 53.
57. Id. at 52.
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unemployment insurance systems were first instituted, labor
movements did not perceive the Ghent system as the ideal or favored
form. As Bo Rothstein points out in his historical comparison,
"[v]oluntary systems seem above all to have been favored by Liberal
governments, while Labor governments have, with one exception,
introduced compulsory schemes."58  That is, the individual
responsibility and self-help features of the Ghent system resonated
more with classical liberal ideology, while compulsory and publicly
provided social insurance as a right of citizenship accorded better
with labor philosophy. 9 Nor can one say that the adoption of a
Ghent-type unemployment insurance scheme was a consequence of
union density and strength. As Rothstein also shows, "there is no
significant correlation between union strength and type of
unemployment scheme in the 1930s," a crucial decade in the
development of unemployment insurance systems.6' The four
countries with the highest levels of union density in those years either
had compulsory or no publicly funded unemployment insurance at
all.6 Further, the mean union density for countries with compulsory
systems was slightly higher than for those with a Ghent system (33%
compared to 25%).62 Thus, the Ghent system was neither
ideologically preferred by labor movements nor was it the result of
labor-movement strength.
B. The Ghent System and Cross-National Union Density
Research in the social sciences has shown that the Ghent system
has a considerable impact on a country's union density, the
proportion of union members in a country's workforce. Union density
is an important measure of union strength and influence, as well as
the extent to which employees are represented in the workplace,
society, and politics. 63 Its steady, decades-long decline in the United
States is the central concern for labor movement leaders, activists,
and supporters. Understanding how the Ghent system influences
union density-especially compared to other, regulatory tools for
addressing union density-is therefore important.
Table 1 ranks various member countries of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") by their
58. Rothstein, supra note 42, at 44.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 43.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Visser, supra note 29, at 38.
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average net union density over the years 1960 to 2 00 8 . 4 As show in
the table, there is a large degree of variation in mean density among
countries. Denmark and Sweden top the list with 76.1% and 70.3% of
their workforces, respectively, belonging to unions. The United States
is close to the bottom at 19.9%, although many are surprised to learn
that the U.S. density exceeds that of France, which, at 14.7%, is found
at the very bottom of the list. A variety of factors could explain this
very large degree of variation in union density. Given the vast
differences in culture and ideology that divide countries such as
Denmark, Sweden, and the United States, cultural and political
explanations are the most commonly cited.65 Yet, however salient
these cultural determinants of union density are, research has shown
that institutional mechanisms, such as the Ghent system, are also
extremely important. 66
Table 1: Union Density and the Ghent System67
a (W:eUll 76.1% 76.7%
Denmark 70.3% 72.0% Yes
Finland 64.1% 72.5% Yes
Norway 56.4%* 54.7%/ No
Austria 50.9% 35.8% No
B~elgium 49.7% 51.8%1 Yes
64. "Net" union density is the share of union members, less unemployed and retired
union members, among wage and salary earners in employment.
65. See, e.g., Fahlbeck, supra note 26, at 307 (highlighting cultural factors, such as
"Americans' traditional distrust of government intervention, suspicion of concerted
activity and collectivism in general, and hostility to compulsory membership in
organizations," to explain the decline of collective bargaining in the United States).
66. See generally WESTERN, supra note 39 (highlighting institutional factors, defined
as "humanly-devised constraints," in contrast to the economic (e.g., the business cycle) or
structural (e.g., manufacturing v. nonmanufacturing) variables that earlier studies of union
density emphasized); Ebbinghaus & Visser, supra note 48 (same). For more on the nature
of institutions, see DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3-10 (1990).
67. Author's estimates are based on OECD data. For further details on data sources
and data-collection methodology, see JELLE VISSER, StBASTIEN MARTIN & PETER
TERGEIST, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
TRADE UNION MEMBERS AND UNION DENSITY IN OECD COUNTRIES, 1-8 (2011),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/2/35695665.pdf.
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Ireland 46.3% 37.1% No
New Zealand 43.5%* 23.4%, . No
Australia 39.7% 24.1% No
United Kingdom 38.7% 29.9% No
Italy 37.6% 34.4% No
Canada' 31.5% 28.3% ' No
Germany 30.8% 23.4% No
Netherlands 30.2% 223% No
Japan 28.3% 20.7% No
Switzerland 26.0% 25% No
United States 19.9% 13.0% No
France 14.7% 8.5% No
Scholars highlight the extent of centralization in union
organization and collective bargaining, the duration and frequency
with which a pro-labor political party is in government, and the Ghent
system as key institutional variables affecting union density. 6 The
relationship between high union density and the Ghent system
emerges very clearly in Table 1. As Table 1 illustrates, all of the
Ghent system countries are in the top six for highest levels of union
density. If one looks at more recent history and takes average union
density between 1998 and 2008 from the third column of Table 1, the
relationship is stronger. Only Norway (a non-Ghent country) barely
surpasses Belgium (a Ghent country) for the fourth-highest level of
union density in the recent decade. Finally, if unemployed and retired
union members are included in the union membership figures, the
relationship is stronger still.69 As Rothstein concludes from a similarly
simple observation of union-density comparisons: "[W]e can say that
it is possible to have a fairly strong union movement without a Ghent
68. See generally WESTERN, supra note 39 (analyzing how various institutional
variables affect union density).
69. Michael Wallerstein & Bruce Western, Unions in Decline? What Has Changed
and Why, 3 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 355, 358 tbl.1 (2000). Unemployed workers in Ghent
system countries are more likely to retain union membership. See infra notes 211-13 and
accompanying text.
[Vol. 90
LABOR LAW AND THE GHENT SYSTEM
system, but that in order to have really strong unions, such a system
seems necessary."7
Strong statements about the importance of the Ghent system,
such as Rothstein's, hold up under more rigorous scrutiny. When one
controls for the other institutional factors just mentioned, cross-
sectional analyses estimate that Ghent system countries have union
densities approximately seventeen percentage points higher than non-
Ghent countries.7' Lyle Scruggs argues that the Ghent system effect is
even more profound and explains eighty-two percent of the change in
diverging densities across European countries in recent decades.72
More sophisticated analyses reinforce the conclusion that the Ghent
system positively impacts union density.73
Some simple case comparisons demonstrate the importance of
the Ghent system while loosely "controlling" for cultural differences
and similarities. For example, Sweden has the Ghent system, but
Norway does not. Despite similarities in union organization,
industrial relations, political institutions, language, geography, and
culture, Sweden's union density has tended to exceed substantially
that of Norway's.7 4 Union density has also differed significantly
between two Benelux countries-Belgium, which has the Ghent
system, and the Netherlands, which does not.75 In both comparisons,
the Ghent country's density exceeds that of the non-Ghent country by
an average of nearly twenty percentage points between 1960 and
2008.76
While the positive empirical relationship between the Ghent
system and high union density is widely acknowledged, much less
attention has been given to understanding the causal linkages
between them. Some scholars cite the Ghent system's amelioration of
the free-rider problem.77 On the other hand, labor legislation is also
70. Rothstein, supra note 42, at 42.
71. WESTERN, supra note 39, at 93.
72. Lyle Scruggs, The Ghent System and Union Membership in Europe, 1970-1996, 55
POL. RES. Q. 275, 286-90 (2002).
73. David Brady, Institutional, Economic, or Solidaristic? Assessing Explanations for
Unionization Across Affluent Democracies, 34 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 67, 89 (2007)
(using a multilevel empirical analysis and finding a positive Ghent system relationship with
union density); Daniele Checchi & Jelle Visser, Pattern Persistence in European Trade
Union Density: A Longitudinal Analysis 1950-1996, 21 EUR. SOC. REV. 1, 9 (2005) (using
a longitudinal empirical analysis and showing a statistically significant and positive
correlation between the Ghent system and union density).
74. WESTERN, supra note 39, at 58.
75. Id. at 57-58.
76. Author's calculation based on OECD data. See VISSER ET AL., supra note 67.
77. See, e.g., Rothstein, supra note 42, at 36-37; Scruggs, supra note 72, at 290-92.
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assumed to play a complementary role in supporting higher levels of
union density. In particular, Western's main argument links union
density with pro-labor political power "through key events, such as a
change in a labor law or an intervention in collective bargaining."78
Yet as Rothstein points out, causation could run the other way:
"Having a large number of workers organized in unions is evidently
an important resource for labor parties competing in national
elections .... ,
Thus, the causal effects of the Ghent system on union density, as
well as the purported influence of labor law, remain undeveloped in
scholarly literature. By explicitly comparing how the Ghent system
and regulatory labor law address three different problems in
collective employment relations-the recognition problem, the free-
rider problem, and the adversarial problem-this Article will begin to
explore how different institutional alternatives influence union
density. As will shortly be seen, not only does the Ghent system
contribute to union density by helping resolve two problems-the
recognition and adversarial problems-that have proved intractable
for countries relying on regulatory systems, but it also addresses these
dilemmas without a substantial, state-based regulatory system of
labor law.
II. REGULATORY AND GOVERNANCE APPROACHES TO THREE
PROBLEMS IN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
How does the Ghent system provide governance answers to
problems in employment representation, and how do these answers
compare to more traditional regulatory approaches under the
NLRA? This Part delves into these questions by comparing each
approach's answer to a set of three interrelated but analytically
distinct employment relations problems that unions everywhere
confront. These problems are labeled the recognition problem, the
free-rider problem, and the adversarial problem. This list of problems
may not be exhaustive, but these problems certainly have bedeviled
collective employment relations in the United States. They also
reflect underlying issues that the EFCA was designed to address.
For many readers, casting the NLRA as a regulatory strategy
may be somewhat puzzling. After all, the NLRA is in many ways a
governance device for addressing workplace problems in that it
contains few substantive provisions and relies on private parties
78. WESTERN, supra note 39, at 66.
79. Rothstein, supra note 42, at 38.
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(unions and employers) and economic pressure (rather than coercive
state power) to generate terms in privately negotiated agreements.
Yet, as this Part demonstrates, the NLRA looks more regulatory once
placed in a comparative perspective. In part, this validates this study's
choice of a comparative analytical strategy. Views about the nature of
the NLRA have been framed by domestic comparisons with other
areas of law. A different picture is presented when the NLRA is
compared with labor laws of other countries.
A. The Recognition Problem
The central dilemma that collective employee representation
faces, and the main problem that the EFCA was intended to address,
is the recognition problem. Social movements and their organizations,
such as labor unions, are defined by the fact that they produce,
provide, or secure collective goods for their beneficiaries,
constituents, or members." One public policy justification for
collective employment representation through labor unions is that
workplace collective goods are underprovided in the labor market.8'
Unions, however, do not produce the collective goods they provide.
Rather, these goods are secured through negotiation and bargaining
with firms, which requires that these firms concede to such
negotiations and recognize unions as legitimate counterparts. 82
1. Comparative Analysis
The current NLRA regime officially endorses a regime of
employee choice with respect to the question of whether to be
represented by a labor union.83 Under this regime, the default rule is
that there is no union representation," but the NLRA also ordains
80. DENNIS CHONG, COLLEcTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1-4
(1991) (describing the goals of the environmental, peace, civil rights, and women's rights
movements as public goods). Note that "public" goods are distinct from "collective"
goods, although the distinction is not relevant to this Article's analysis. See infra note 156.
81. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 3-11
(1984).
82. The problem of recognition has been most noted in the study of social
movements. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. GAMSON, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL PROTEST 31-34
(1975) (discussing the four main indicators of acceptance); SIDNEY TARROW, POWER IN
MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 7 (2d ed. 1998)
(commenting that, in general, the outcome of any social movement is dependent upon
recognition of and reaction to that movement).
83. Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice, A Structural Approach to the Rules
of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655,656-57 (2010).
84. Id. at 658-59.
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procedures for union recognition when employees express a
preference for representation.85
The current legal framework governing union recognition in the
United States works in the following way. First, a labor union will
petition the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") to conduct a
representation election among a group of employees after it secures
signed "authorization cards" from thirty percent of the workers.8 6 It is
important to note that signing an authorization card does not
constitute membership in the union but is merely the employee's
acknowledgement that she would like to have a representation
election in the workplace.87 If a union prevails with fifty percent-plus-
one of the vote, then the NLRB certifies the union as the exclusive
bargaining agent of the employees under section 9(a) of the NLRA. 8
Being an exclusive bargaining representative triggers a duty to
bargain on the part of the employer, the violation of which is an
unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(5).19
Recently, Benjamin Sachs has argued that when there is
uncertainty about which default rule (in this case, union or nonunion
representation) best maximizes the statutory objective (in this case,
employee choice); one solution is to adopt a process that mitigates
any impediments that hinder departure from the default setting.90 In
his analysis, the current NLRA procedure for union recognition fails
to meet this standard because it does not sufficiently contain
employer interference and opposition to union representation.91 For
instance, once a petition for a certification election is filed, workers
must wait an average of forty-one days before the election is held, 92 a
85. Id. at 664 & n.24.
86. National Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A) (2006).
Where the NLRA requires a "substantial" showing of interest, the "Board by rule defines
'substantial' to mean at least thirty percent." See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra
note 1, at 542-44. For strategic reasons, unions in practice typically seek a much larger
showing of interest. See John-Paul Ferguson, The Eyes of the Needles: A Sequential Model
of Union Organizing Drives, 1999-2004,62 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3,4-5 (2008).
87. See CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING
DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 83 (2005) (distinguishing
authorization cards used merely to secure a representation election from membership
cards).
88. National Labor Relations Act §§ 9(a), (c)(1)(A), (c)(3) (stating in section 9(a)
that "[r]epresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees").
89. National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a)(5), 9(a).
90. See Sachs, supra note 83, at 659.
91. Id. at 660.
92. Ferguson, supra note 86, at 10 n.9.
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period that gives the employer ample opportunity to mount a fierce
resistance to the unionization drive. Under Board-developed election
law, the employer can require employees to attend "captive
audience" meetings where it can present its case against the union to
the employees; 93 unions have no corresponding right or effective
opportunity. 94 In addition, the Supreme Court has declared that
employers' property rights trump union organizers' rights of access to
employees in the workplace.95 Section 8(a)(3) is supposed to prevent
employers from firing, disciplining, or otherwise discouraging workers
from seeking union membership and representation. However, "[t]he
current system of unfair labor practice remedies has proved powerless
to contain [employer] intimidation or to undo its effects."96 Current
remedies are limited to compensatory damages-specifically,
compensation for the mitigated loss of earnings-and reinstatement. 97
Even a union victory in a representation campaign is no guarantee of
success. In cases where unions prevail in NLRB elections, only
slightly less than fifty-six percent achieve a first collective agreement
due in part to employer recalcitrance, resistance, and dilatory or bad-
faith bargaining, despite the employer's duty to bargain with a
certified representative. 98
EFCA's primary goal was to address this recognition problem
and its attendant legal defects. EFCA would have substituted card
check recognition for a secret ballot election administered by the
93. See Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections
and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495,557-58 (1993).
94. See Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for Union Control, 94 VA. L.
REV. 1, 23 (2008).
95. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 538 (1992). See generally Cynthia L.
Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 305 (1994)
(criticizing the Supreme Court's Lechmere decision and advocating for a more limited
employer property right with respect to union organizers' access).
96. Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1770 (1983).
97. National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 28 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006); Alaska Pulp
Corp., 326 N.L.R.B. 522, 523 (1998), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Sever v. NLRB,
231 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2000); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 2750-61 (John E.
Higgins, Jr. et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006). In the typical case of employee discharge or
discrimination for union activity, "the Board normally orders reinstatement of the
employee, with back pay, and issues a cease-and-desist order proscribing similar
misconduct in the future." Id. at 2750.
98. Ferguson, supra note 86, at 5 fig.1, 16. This rate is now lower than the one
reported a few decades ago. See Paul C. Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of
Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 354 (1984)
("Only slightly more than 60% of newly certified units achieve a [first] collective
agreement .... ).
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NLRB.99 The goal of card check is both to expedite the election
process and deprive the employer of its information privilege during
the election "campaign."' 0 Sachs also considers "rapid secret-ballot
elections" as an alternative to card check that would similarly lower
barriers to departure from the nonunion default rule."0' EFCA would
also have levied treble damages against employers who discriminate
against union supporters, making it costlier for employers to
intimidate and threaten workers.0 2 Finally, by providing the
opportunity for binding arbitration in order to ensure a first contract,
EFCA sought to impose a stronger remedy against employers who
flout their duty to bargain.'03
One might think that with pro-labor, social-democratic parties
frequently in power, Swedish and Danish governments would have
long ago legislated streamlined procedures for union recognition, stiff
penalties for the harassment of union supporters, and a compelling
duty for employers to bargain with unions. Yet, the opposite is more
nearly the case. The "rather startling phenomenon" is that there is no
formal procedure for union recognition in either of these countries.
1°4
Representation elections are entirely absent in Swedish labor law. 105
Presumably this absence exists in Denmark as well, since Danish
collective-bargaining law does not discuss the subject of
representation elections.0 6
Like the United States, both Swedish and Danish labor laws
establish statutory protection for workers' "freedom of association,"
that is, the right of workers to form, join, and assist labor unions. In
Sweden, employees (and employers) "have the right to organize
involving (1) the right to belong to a trade union or employers'
association, (2) to make use of the membership, (3) to work for the
99. Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. § 2(a) (2009). For an
explanation of the card check recognition process, see Sachs, supra note 83, at 668
("Under a card check regime, employees would register their choice on the question of
unionization by signing a card indicating that they want a union to serve as their agent for
purposes of collective bargaining with the employer.").
100. See Sachs, supra note 83, at 657-59.
101. Id.
102. H.R. 1409 § 4.
103. Id. § 3.
104. Reinhold Fahlbeck & Bernard Johann Mulder, Sweden, in 2A INTERNATIONAL
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS 19-1, 19-53 (William L. Keller & Timothy J. Darby
eds., 3d ed. 2008).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 19-52 to -53 ("From a comparative law perspective, this [absence of a
recognition procedure] is a rather startling phenomenon, but Sweden shares it with its
fellow Nordic countries.").
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organization, and (4) to work to establish such an organization." 107
Arguably, the NLRA's broad prohibition against union membership
discrimination protects an identical list of activities.'08 Current law in
Sweden makes a transgressing employer liable for compensatory as
well as-and this is the important distinction-punitive damages.'0 9
However, the enactment of these stronger remedies is too recent to
explain Sweden's high level of union density. Workers' associational
rights are now codified in the 1976 Co-Determination Act. "0 Prior to
this act, statutory rights to association were originally established in
1940 by amendment to the 1936 Act on the Rights of Association and
Negotiation." Those 1940 amendments made compensatory
damages, including damages for "personal suffering"-but not
punitive damages-available to aggrieved workers. 12 Therefore, prior
to 1976, the remedy for violating workers' associational rights was
perhaps stronger than in the United States, but only marginally so.
In Denmark, statutory law also protects workers' freedom of
association, declaring that "an employer is not allowed to let an
employee's decision to join or not to join a union influence decisions
regarding employment or termination.""' 3 An employee who is
discriminated against is entitled to compensation, which is not to
exceed twenty-four months' salary and is based on the employee's
seniority and circumstances of dismissal. 4 Punitive damages or
statutory penalties are not available as remedies. In fact, the statutory
vintage of associational rights in Denmark is even more recent than in
Sweden." 5 In Danish law, union membership statutory rights were
107. Id. at 19-50.
108. The bedrock grant of rights under the NLRA is quite broad and gives to
employees the rights to "self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations...
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection." National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
The NLRA further makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with,
restrain or coerce employees" in the exercise of those rights. Id. § 8(a)(1). In addition to
protecting the rights to join or form unions, the Act also protects employees who work for
labor unions as professional organizers. See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. 85,
98 (1995).
109. Fahlbeck & Mulder, supra note 104, at 19-51.
110. Id. at 19-50.
111. FOLKE SCHMIDT, THE LAW OF LABOUR RELATIONS IN SWEDEN 128, 251-52,
256-57 (1962).
112. Id. at 256-57.
113. Jacob Sand, Denmark, in 2A INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS,
supra note 104, at 12-1, 12-27 to -28.
114. Id. at 12-28.
115. OLE HASSELBALCH, LABOUR LAW IN DENMARK 193-96 (2005). Prior to this, it
appears that workers' freedom of association was established by collective agreement,
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first codified in the Dismissals on Grounds of Union Membership
Act. 16 This legislation was a response to a decision of the European
Court of Human Rights in a case against British Rail in 1981 and was
intended to make Danish law conform to that decision." 7 Therefore,
in neither Denmark nor Sweden can stronger remedies for
associational rights violations-to the extent that they are stronger at
all-explain their higher densities, which were already 73.9% in
Sweden in 1976 and 79.9% in Denmark in 1981.118
What of the employer's duty to bargain? Once again, the
intuitive guess might be that no such liberal, "freedom of contract"
concern-which underlies the thin, good-faith standard governing the
duty in the United States ul9-would limit employers' obligations in
the social democracies of Northern Europe. But, this again would be
the wrong guess. Swedish labor law recognizes a duty to bargain, but
[t]he duty to bargain is limited .... There is no obligation to
sign a contract (even if agreement has been reached on all
substantive matters) nor is there any obligation to compromise
or even to show a willingness to compromise or to reach
common ground. In other words, Swedish labor law does not
recognize a good-faith bargaining requirement [unlike U.S.
labor law]. 2 0
Damages are available where there is a violation of the duty to
bargain, but "[b]ecause the duty to bargain is so limited, damages on
the whole are confined to situations where the employer has refused
to appear at the bargaining table at all." '121 The duty to bargain,
therefore, appears to be stronger in the United States than in Sweden.
In other words, freedom of contract in collective bargaining is better
rather than by statute. Id. at 194-96. The importance of the distinction is that, prior to
codification, workers' freedom of association was a consequence, not a cause, of union
strength and density in Denmark.
116. See id. at 193-94. In addition, "from 1992 a general Act on Implementation of the
European Convention on Human Rights sets the basis of protection of the right to
organize according to Article 11 of the Convention." Id. at 193. The Dismissals on
Grounds of Union Membership Act has been superseded by the 2006 Act on Protection
against Discrimination Due to Membership or Nonmembership in a Union. See Sand,
supra note 113, at 12-27 to -28.
117. HASSELBALCH, supra note 115, at 193-94.
118. ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., TRADE UNION
DENSITY, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=UNDEN (next to "Change
data selection," follow the "Time" hyperlink and then select the desired date range) (last
visited Jan. 1, 2012).
119. See Weiler, supra note 98, at 357-59.
120. Fahlbeck & Mulder, supra note 104, at 19-56.
121. Id.
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regarded in social-democratic Sweden than in the free-market United
States. Unlike either Sweden or the United States, a legal duty to
bargain appears to be entirely absent in Danish labor law."12
2. The Ghent System and the Recognition Problem
How then does Sweden or Denmark resolve the recognition
problem without a stiff regulatory regime of representation elections,
strong formal protections (historically in Sweden) against employer
coercion, or a strong duty to bargain? In Scandinavia, one of the most
important factors reducing employer opposition and encouraging
union recognition is more centralized wage bargaining. In the United
States, collective bargaining tends to take place between local unions
and individual firms, establishments, or plants. 123 In Scandinavia, as in
much of Western Europe, by contrast, bargaining takes place
between a union and employer association representing an entire
industry or sometimes the whole nation. 124 More centralized collective
bargaining is said to "take wages out of competition."'" Since all
employers in an industry pay the same or similar wage, none is
particularly disfavored relative to the others by collective bargaining.
This practice also tends to be associated with more "authoritative"
organizations of union and employer associations, which prevent
122. Neither HASSELBALCH, supra note 115, nor Sand, supra note 113, mentions a
duty to bargain in Danish labor law. A quite prominent feature of Danish industrial
relations is the use of compulsory conciliation. See Steen Scheuer, Denmark: A Less
Regulated Model, in CHANGING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN EUROPE 146, 151 (Anthony
Ferner & Richard Hyman eds., 2d ed. 1998). During new contract negotiations, Danish
labor law gives the government's Conciliation Service the right to demand that a work
stoppage (strike or lockout) be postponed or suspended for fourteen days, as well as to
make recommendations, although the conciliator has no authority to impose a final
agreement. See HASSELBALCH, supra note 115, at 276-79. Despite the larger role of the
conciliator, however, this procedure is not so different than the sixty-day cooling-off
period imposed by the NLRA's duty to bargain. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(d),
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006). Furthermore, since it restricts work stoppages, it is not so clear
that this procedure benefits unions or union density. Finally, although similar procedures
also exist in Sweden, in most instances mediation is at the request of one of the parties to
the dispute, and mediators cannot make recommendations, which again suggests it has
limited impact on union density. See Fahlbeck & Mulder, supra note 104, at 19-72; Anders
Kjellberg, Sweden: Restoring the Model?, in CHANGING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN
EUROPE 74, 91 (Anthony Ferner & Richard Hyman eds., 2d ed. 1998) (calling the
"voluntary and informal Swedish mediation machinery... weak by Nordic standards").
123. Wallerstein & Western, supra note 69, at 364.
124. Id. at 364, 366 tbl.3.
125. See Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further Reflections on the Distinctive
Character of American Labor Laws, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1, 106 (arguing that standardizing
wages across an industry removes "the most important source of employer objection to
unionization").
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"defections" of local unions or individual employers that may have an
interest in circumventing the industry-wide agreement, but in doing
so risk undermining the existence of industry-level coordination and
their attendant benefits.'26
Nevertheless, the Ghent system also plays an important role.
Although workers may initially come to unions merely to enroll in
their unemployment insurance plans, the Ghent system also provides
unions with an incomparable organizing tool.'27 As will be discussed
in the next Section, participation in union-administered plans induces
an obligation-as a social norm, if not a legal duty-that workers
become union members.12 8 Further, union membership, in turn,
entails educating workers about the union and its benefits, building
social networks and ties of solidarity among members, and the
accretion of financial resources that come from member
contributions. 129 These resources give the union de facto power to
induce voluntary (i.e., nonlegal) recognition from employers.
Government-supported recognition procedures are unnecessary. In
this way, the Ghent system helps sustain a "critical mass" of union
supporters, which encourages employer recognition of the union and
contributes to further gains in union membership.130
126. See Erik Olin Wright, Working-Class Power, Capitalist-Class Interests, and Class
Compromise, 105 AM. J. SOC. 957, 976 (2000) (arguing that greater associational power
among workers and unions can prevent defections by individual firms or unions in
strategic-choice situations that pose dilemmas to cooperative gains). See generally John S.
Ahlquist, Building Strategic Capacity: The Political Underpinnings of Coordinated Wage
Bargaining, 104 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 171 (2010) (finding that more unequal membership
levels across unions inhibit the centralization of the authority over strike powers, and that
centralization of strike powers is a strong predictor of more coordinated wage bargaining).
127. Clasen & Viebrock, supra note 41, at 445 (describing the Ghent system as a
"recruitment tool" for Danish and Swedish labor unions).
128. See infra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
129. See Cheol-Sung Lee, Labor Unions and Good Governance: A Cross-National,
Comparative Analysis, 72 AM. Soc. REV. 585, 587-90 (2007) (describing unions'
"abundant human and material resources" and the ways that labor unions forge
"associational ties" among members and between unions and other social organizations);
see also Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law,
89 GEo. L.J. 1, 70 (2000) ("[U]nions actively cultivate solidarity, egalitarian values, and
democratic practices, and they multiply opportunities for constructive interaction among
coworkers through the vehicles of union governance and collective bargaining.").
130. On the role of the "critical mass" in collective action, see generally GERALD
MARWELL & PAMELA OLIVER, THE CRITICAL MASS IN COLLECTIVE ACTION (1993)
(arguing for the importance of "tipping points" or the "critical mass" in overcoming
collective action problems). While traditional collective action theory generally assumed a
static framework for decision making, Marwell and Oliver show how in a dynamic model
("sequential interdependence") the decisions of early participants influence those of later
participants. Id. at 9-11, 32. The general idea is that people are more likely to engage in
collective action when they observe others already doing so, rather than when everyone
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Evidence for this proposed mechanism becomes clear when one
compares Sweden and Denmark to other countries that lack the
Ghent system but possess otherwise similar institutional supports for
recognition, such as centralized bargaining or its functional
equivalent, collective agreement "extension" procedures.13 1 Even
when broad, industry-level recognition is obtained by unions for wage
bargaining, countries such as France or Germany frequently rely on
statutory means for securing representation of employee interests
through nonunion channels in workplace bargaining. 132 Although the
institutional details are more complex than can be fully explored
here, both of these countries have legislatively mandated forms of
"works-council" representation at the workplace level. 133 In fact,
unions in both countries, where union density is lower than in
Denmark or Sweden, have come to depend on these institutionally
distinct works-councils to bolster their presence at the workplace
level. 134 In contrast, works-councils are redundant in Denmark and
Sweden, where in addition to the unions' higher, industry-level
presence, they are also able to secure strong workplace
makes a simultaneous decision to participate or not without the ability to observe others'
commitments or contributions.
131. Extension, or erga omnes, provisions in labor law establish procedures for
extending collective agreements to cover employers in the same industry who have not
agreed to its terms individually or through its relevant employers' association. See Greg J.
Bamber et al., Collective Bargaining: International Developments and Challenges, in
COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED
MARKET ECONOMIES 609, 635 (Roger Blanpain ed., rev. ed. 2010). Danish labor law
features extension procedures, but they are "used only to transpose the contents of EU
Directives." Franz Traxler & Martin Behrens, Collective Bargaining Coverage and
Extension Procedures, EIRONLINE (Dec. 18, 2002), http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro
/2002/12/study/tn0212102s.htm.
132. See generally M. Biagi & M. Tiraboschi, Forms of Employee Representational
Participation, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN
INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES, supra note 131, at 523 (giving a comparative
analysis of "representational participation" in the private sector of industrialized market
economies).
133. Works-councils are organized bodies for representational communication between
a single employer and the employees of a single plant, enterprise, or workplace, as distinct
from an industrial sector or territorial region. They represent all workers at a given
workplace, irrespective of whether they are union members, and may discuss and
negotiate over a wide range of workplace matters, from compensation to production,
depending on national and legislative circumstance. For a more detailed definition and
typology, see Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck, The Study of Works Councils: Concepts
and Problems, in WORKS COUNCILS: CONSULTATION, REPRESENTATION, AND
COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 3, 6-11 (Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck
eds., 1995).
134. See Biagi & Tiraboschi, supra note 132, at 542-43.
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representation through their local organizations, the "clubs."' 35
Indeed, Sweden experimented with an additional system of works-
councils for several years, which proved superfluous and was later
abandoned.'36 Arguably, the Ghent system can explain these
differences in workplace representation. Thus, the Ghent system
provides a tool for recruiting workers into unions and raising union
density. This greater membership density helps sustain recognition of
union organization in the workplace.
The Ghent system approach to union recognition contrasts
markedly with the American approach. As noted previously, under
U.S. labor law the default rule is that workers will not be represented
by a union.137 In contrast, in Denmark and Sweden the question of
whether the default rule for employee representation should be union
or nonunion is a nonissue. Rather, all the action takes place at the
level of the employee's decision to join the union, rather than the
employer's decision to recognize the union. In that respect, Danish
and Swedish law reflects a preference for union membership, if not a
formal preference for union representation of workers, by subsidizing
union insurance funds.
The attention the Ghent system gives to the union-member
relationship, as distinct from the union-employer relationship, helps
avoid some difficulties surrounding the recognition problem that arise
under the NLRA. One difficulty is the willingness of workers to
remain committed to the union.'38 Under the Ghent system, unions
are able to establish and develop relationships with workers that exist
independently of the employer's recognition of the union.'39 In the
United States, some of the more active organizing unions do attempt
to educate and build networks of solidarity among workers in the run
up to a certification election."4 But, because the ultimate outcome for
union membership is itself uncertain-since in practice employees do
135. See id. at 525-32; Kjellberg, supra note 122, at 104-06.
136. Biagi & Tiraboschi, supra note 132, at 546. This does not imply that Swedish
union-based forms of workplace representation are without legal cognizance. See Rogers
& Streeck, supra note 133, at 9.
137. See supra text accompanying note 84.
138. See DAN CLAWSON, THE NEXT UPSURGE: LABOR AND THE NEW SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS 2-12 (2003) (portraying the importance and difficulty of building worker
commitment to the union in two contrasting organizing campaigns).
139. See Clasen & Viebrock, supra note 41, at 440-41.
140. See CLAWSON, supra note 138, at 9-10 (contrasting "business union" organizing,
which contemplates minimal worker participation and involvement, with "union building"
organizing, which helps develop workers' own talents and capacities and builds on the
preexisting networks of their work groups); Sachs, supra note 83, at 664-65.
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not become union members until after a successful representation
campaign-this can be a difficult task."' Furthermore, employers
have the right to hold "captive audience" meetings on company
premises and to exclude organizers from company property; there are
no corresponding opportunities for the unions, 42 so the employer
holds advantages that make it more difficult for unions to cultivate
enduring attachments to workers prior to a successful election.
Building union membership through the employer's recognition
of the union, rather than through a direct union-employee connection
as under the Ghent system, also creates substantial disincentives for
unions during the recognition process. When membership
recruitment follows recognition, a union can recuperate its organizing
expenditures only after a successful organizing (really, recognition)
drive.143 In addition, given that recognition is a dichotomous "yes" or
"no" determination, the union will either represent none or all of the
members of the bargaining unit following the election.'" This all-or-
nothing aspect of organizing raises the stakes for both the union and
the employer, generating more risk for the union and a greater
incentive for the employer to resist the union.145
Even the EFCA would have done nothing to shift the focus of
the recognition problem from the union-employer relationship to the
union-member relationship. Certainly, one goal of the EFCA is to
minimize the role of the employer's attitude toward unionization by
expediting the election process through card check recognition. 146 But
even advocates recognize that card check or rapid elections would not
completely "deprive management of its ability to mount an argument
against unionization.' ' 47 As such, it is likely that employers would
141. See MORRIS, supra note 87, at 184-88 (arguing that more worker commitment
could be established if unions changed their organizing practices and asked workers to
become union members prior to a representation election).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
143. Workers typically do not join the union until after the union prevails in a
representation election. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
144. This follows from the majoritarian rule for representation under the NLRA.
National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006). A proportional
representational rule could yield different results. See infra text accompanying note 152.
145. This is probably a reason why unions on the whole continue to devote too little
resources to organizing. When John Sweeney assumed the presidency of the AFL-CIO, he
recommended that unions dedicate twenty percent of their budgets to organizing, yet only
a handful of unions come close to meeting this benchmark. Richard Freeman & Joel
Rogers, A Proposal to American Labor: Let's Create "Open-Source Unions, " and Welcome
Millions into the Movement, NATION (N.Y.C.), June 6, 2002, at 18, 20.
146. See Sachs, supra note 83, at 657-58.
147. Id. at 662.
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continue to seek to influence the outcome and adapt accordingly in
the new card check environment just as they did under the current
representation procedure, which itself was initially favorable to
unions."' Finally, since the central purpose of card check is to
expedite the recognition process, this may cause unions to invest even
less time and resources into forming pre-recognition bonds with
workers.
The sequence of union recognition flowing from member
recruitment under the Ghent system is nearly the same as what recent
labor law scholars have called "minority" or "members-only"
organizing.14 9 The practice refers to union representation of a
proportion of the workforce less than the majority required to prevail
in an NLRB election or of only those workers who become members
of the union, in contrast to an entire Board-certified, exclusively
represented bargaining unit. 5° In fact, members-only organizing was
the American practice prior to the passage of the Wagner Act, as well
as during its early history.15' As under the Ghent system, union
representation under minority-union organizing does not depend on
prevailing in a certification election; rather, recognition is often an
organic process flowing from the accretion of union members.
Further cementing the similarity, union representation in Denmark
and Sweden is, at least as a legal matter, proportional while union
representation under the NLRA is majoritarian and exclusive. 5 2 That
is, Danish and Swedish unions legally represent only their members,
while American unions represent the entire bargaining unit certified
by the NLRB, whether or not workers are union members.
The only salient difference between proposals for a return to
members-only organizing and organizing under the Ghent system is
the absence of a tangible benefit for new union members under the
former. Enrollment in an unemployment insurance fund provides that
benefit under the Ghent system. a53 Otherwise, collective bargaining
gains from an employer are likely to be slight when the union
represents only a minority of the workforce. 154 Thus, the up-front
148. See MORRIS, supra note 87, at 81-88.
149. See id. at 1-13; Freeman & Rogers, supra note 145, at 18.
150. See MORRIS, supra note 87, at 1-13.
151. See id. at 81-88.
152. Fahlbeck & Mulder, supra note 104, at 19-53.
153. See supra text accompanying note 40.
154. Although Freeman & Rogers, supra note 145, at 18 as well as MORRIS, supra note
87, at 191, rightly insist that even a small, members-only unit can serve important
functions, these benefits are slight compared to the hours, compensation, and other terms
that full contract bargaining entails.
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benefits that come under the Ghent system greatly enhance the
effectiveness of proportional representation and members-only
organizing.
Once contrasted with the Ghent system, it then appears strange
that a system of labor law, such as the one established by the NLRA,
would make the employee's decision to join the union so vitally
dependent on the employer's decision to recognize the union. Yet, it
is remarkable how deeply these distinct decisions are conflated in
American labor law consciousness, where the employer's recognition
of the union is habitually equated with employees' ability to "form a
union."15
B. The Free-Rider Problem
The collective nature of many of the goods unions provide to
workers poses another pervasive dilemma for labor unions: the free-
rider problem. 156  Whenever the benefits of group action are
collective-they cannot be provided to some without providing them
to all-there is an incentive for a member of the group to "free ride"
on the contributions of others and not join or support the group's
efforts.157 Yet, if too many members free ride, the collective goods or
the organizations that provide them are unlikely to emerge at all.158
Since many of the benefits that unions provide are collective in
practice, the free-rider problem is pervasive for labor unions. 15 9
155. This is the standard language the AFL-CIO used to advocate for the EFCA. See
AFL-CIO, EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACr: KEY FAcTS 1 (Jan. 2009), available at http://
www.aflcio.org/joinaunion/voiceatwork/efca/upload/keyfacts__0209.pdf.
156. The classic statement of the free-rider problem and the provision of public and
collective goods remains MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 76
(Schoken Books 1971) (1965). For a critical elaboration of Olson's theory of collective
action, see generally MARWELL & OLIVER, supra note 130 (relaxing some of Olson's
stronger assumptions in order to demonstrate that collective action may be more likely
than Olson's original analysis predicted). Collective goods are distinct from public goods.
See supra note 80. Both public and collective goods are "nonexcludable," meaning that it
is not possible to exclude a person from consuming them. It is this feature that creates the
free-rider problem and drives this Article's analysis. The difference between public and
collective goods is that pure public goods are "nonrivalrous," meaning that one person's
consumption of the good does not affect another's consumption of that good. See
MARWELL & OLIVER, supra note 130, at 41-42. Clean air might be the best example of a
pure public good. Collective goods, on the other hand, are "rivalrous." Id. at 42-43. Wage
increases or grievance adjustments are good examples of collective goods, since the
resources of the firm or union upon which these goods draw are clearly subject to such
rivalrous crowding.
157. See OLSON, supra note 156, at 11, 27-28, 33-36.
158. Id. at 44.
159. Labor unions occupied a central place in Olson's original analysis. See id. at 66-97.
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Accordingly, all labor movements seek to minimize or eliminate the
free-rider problem through social norms, institutions, laws, or any
combination of these factors.
1. Comparative Analysis
U.S. labor law addresses the free-rider problem through
statutorily authorized union-security agreements. A union-security
agreement-such as a closed shop, union shop, or agency shop-
obligates the employee to contribute some form of support to the
union as a condition of continued employment. 16° Several federal
courts have held that union-security agreements are contractual
agreements between private actors, 61 and, in that strict legal sense,
they do not constitute a regulatory response to the free-rider
problem. Nevertheless, other courts have held that the NLRA's
authorization of union-security agreements does in fact transform
such agreements into state action. 162 Furthermore, both the statute
and the Board's administrative case law play an exceedingly large role
in establishing the permissible contours of union-security
agreements. 163 In addition, union-security agreements are, in practice,
intimately related to-even conditioned by-the Board's certification
of unions as employees' exclusive representatives as well as to its
procedures for determining bargaining units, both quintessentially
legal-administrative acts.'64
160. A closed shop requires an employer to hire and maintain in employment only
union members; a union shop allows an employer to hire either union members or
nonmembers but requires employees to become union members within a certain period of
time as a condition of employment; an agency shop is like a union shop, except that
employees are only obligated to make financial contributions to the union and are not
required to become formal members. See 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note
97, at 2102, 2104-05, 2143-44.
161. See, e.g., Kolinske v. Lubbers, 712 F.2d 471, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Price v. UAW,
722 F. Supp. 933, 936 (D. Conn. 1989); Abrams v. Commc'ns Workers, 702 F. Supp. 920,
923 (D.D.C. 1988), affd, 884 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
162. See, e.g., Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 1971) (finding that a
union-shop agreement under the NLRA constituted government action because "[t]he
federal statute is the source of the power and authority by which any private rights are lost
or sacrificed" (quoting Ry. Emps.' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225,232 (1956))).
163. See infra text accompanying notes 165-78.
164. While the NLRA grants to employees "the right to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing[,] ... [tihe Act also establishes [the representation
election as the] procedure through which employees may choose a bargaining
representative," and vests in the Board "the broad duty of providing election procedures
and safeguards." 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 472-73. Unions can
only bargain for union-security agreements after they have been designated as bargaining
representatives, and the Board's certification procedures have historically been the
primary means by which designation is achieved. Id. at 639-40. Even more important,
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Statutory support for union-security agreements is spelled out in
the NLRA. Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to discriminate among employees on the basis of union
membership.165 However, a proviso to that section states that nothing
"shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor
organization... to require as a condition of employment membership
therein" as long as the labor organization has been 'certified as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees. 166 Legislative
history reveals a clear intention of permitting union-security
agreements precisely in order to prevent the free-rider problem,
where "the man who does not pay dues rides along freely without any
expense to himself."167
However, from the inception of the NLRA, this method of
resolving the free-rider problem has been fiercely contested. First,
passed by Congress in 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act curtailed union-
security devices in several ways. Taft-Hartley prohibited the closed
shop, 16 a union-security agreement in which the employer agrees to
hire only union members, and nominally endorsed the union shop, 169
which allows the employer to hire anyone but obligates the employee
to become a union member thirty days after her employment begins.
establishing unions as exclusive representatives gets unions halfway toward a union-
security agreement, and the NLRA's and Board's role in this decision has been explicitly
construed as state action. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944)
(holding that "the Railway Labor Act imposes upon the statutory representative of a craft
at least as exacting a duty to protect equally the interests of the members of the craft as
the Constitution imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection to the interests of
those for whom it legislates" (emphasis added)). Also, under the NLRA, the Board has
the authority to determine "whether the unit of employees in which the petitioner seeks
an election is an 'appropriate unit' for collective bargaining." 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW, supra note 1, at 640. "The bargaining unit provides the formal arena of the entire
collective bargaining process," id. at 639 (emphasis added), and decisions about the size
and composition of the bargaining unit "can determine whether the union is entitled to
representative status," id. at 640, and hence whether a union can bargain for a union
security agreement.
165. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006).
166. Id.
167. Commc'ns Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 748 (1988) (citing 93 Cong. Rec. 4887
(1947)).
168. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3). The Taft-Hartley Act narrowed section
8(a)(3)'s saving proviso by permitting only union-security agreements that required union
membership "on or after the thirtieth day following" the date of hire. Taft-Hartley Act,
ch. 120, sec. 101, § 8(a)(3), 61 Stat. 136, 141 (1947).
169. Although the language of the union shop is frequently used to refer to the Taft-
Hartley change, the legal effect was to allow only the agency shop. 2 THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW, supra note 97, at 2104-05, 2143-44; see infra text accompanying notes 170-
72.
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Union membership under Taft-Hartley, however, required little
more than paying one's dues. That Act also added a second proviso to
section 8(a)(3) that prohibited discrimination if the employer "has
reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or
terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to
tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as
a condition of acquiring or retaining membership."' 7 °  The
consequence of this second proviso in Supreme Court jurisprudence
has been to make "membership" in section 8(a)(3)'s first proviso
mean little more than its "financial core."'' That is, an employee
cannot be terminated for losing her membership after not
participating in a strike, not regularly attending union meetings, or
otherwise failing to meet the nonmonetary obligations of
membership.
172
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have in turn narrowed the
scope of this financial core obligation. In Communications Workers v.
Beck, 7 3 the Court declared that this "financial core" does not include
any monetary obligation to "support union activities beyond those
germane to collective bargaining, contract administration, and
grievance adjustment."' 74 Consequently, Beck raised the question of
whether unions could spend dues paid by union dissenters on
"activities such as organizing the employees of other employers,
lobbying for labor legislation, and participating in social, charitable,
and political events."' 75 Political 176 and organizing 177 expenditures in
particular have been the subject of fierce judicial debate.
170. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3).
171. NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963).
172. In re Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1073, 1078 (1950) (deciding that union
members are not subject to discharge for not paying fines assessed for infractions of
internal union rules), enforced per curiam, 196 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1952).
173. 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
174. Id. at 745.
175. Id. at 735.
176. See, e.g., Lenhert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 513 (1991); Chi. Teachers
Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 294-95 (1986); Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline &
S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 439 (1984); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 223-24
(1971).
177. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB, 307 F.3d 760,
771 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that dues charged to dissenting agency-shop members should
include the cost of organizing workers outside of the bargaining unit). For a fuller
discussion of the use of dissenters' dues for union organizing, see generally Christopher
David Ruiz Cameron, The Wages of Syntax: Why the Cost of Organizing a Union Firm's
Non-Union Competition Should Be Charged to "Financial Core" Employees, 47 CATH. U.
L. REV. 979 (1998).
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Finally, and most infamously for labor-union supporters, Taft-
Hartley amended the NLRA to authorize states to prohibit collective
agreements from having any form of union-security agreement.
17 8
This prohibition has resulted in the passage of so-called "right-to-
work" legislation in nearly half of the states (currently twenty-two). 179
Employees who receive the benefits of union representation in right-
to-work states have no obligation, financial or otherwise, to support
the union as a condition of continued employment.
Limitations on the legal scope of union-security agreements have
most likely had deleterious effects on union density. Prohibiting the
closed shop substantially reduces the value of union membership,
especially to the unemployed union member. 80 Under an agency
shop or union shop agreement, the employer can hire anyone and
can, therefore, hire from a much larger pool of potential workers.1
8 1
Under a closed shop, by contrast, an employer can hire only from the
pool of job-seeking union members, making the reemployment
prospects of union members much higher compared to the agency
shop, and, therefore, increasing substantially the benefits of union
membership. 82
Constricting union membership obligations to their financial core
also weakens unions' economic power. Continued financial support
from the membership is not the only collective action dilemma that
unions must solve. Unions must count on their members' physical
participation, especially in strikes, organizing, and other actions.'8 '
"Financial core" membership furthermore transforms the union-
member relationship into a bare monetary transaction and deprives
the employee of the experience of the norms, culture, and solidarities
that can be acquired as part of the civic community a union
provides.184
178. National Labor Relations Act § 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (2006).
179. Right to Work States, NAT'L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEF. FOUND., http://www
.nrtw.org/rtws.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2012).
180. Beck, 487 U.S. at 760 (quoting Senator Taft during debates over the Taft-Hartley
Act that the main difference between the closed shop and the union shop is that under the
latter "a man can get a job without joining the union or asking favors of the union").
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. Kim Voss & Rachel Sherman, Breaking the Iron Law of Oligarchy: Union
Revitalization in the American Labor Movement, 106 AM. J. Soc. 303, 313 (2000)
(describing the importance of greater member participation in union organizing efforts).
184. Molly S. McUsic & Michael Selmi, Postmodern Unions: Identity Politics in the
Workplace, 82 IOWA L. REv. 1339, 1341-42 (1997) (viewing labor unions as one of the few
"institution[s] of community" available to workers in the United States).
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The effect of right-to-work legislation has received an enormous
amount of empirical investigation.185 A number of studies have
concluded that right-to-work legislation has had significant negative
effects on unions.186 Several studies show that the level of free riding
is higher in right-to-work states, implying that the legislation hinders
union growth in these states because of the increased costs borne by
those who would otherwise prefer union representation. 87 Other
studies cite right-to-work legislation as an important factor in the
decline of private-sector national union membership. 18 The argument
is that right-to-work legislation slows the growth rate of unions not
only in adopting states, but also in union shop states, as capital
migrates from the latter to the former in search of cheap labor.1 89
Despite these severe obstacles to overcoming the free-rider problem,
EFCA proposes no specific provision to address them.
How is the free-rider problem solved in a country with
dramatically higher levels of union density, such as Sweden or
Denmark? One might guess that in these countries with a very strong
social-democratic history and culture there would be little qualm in
obligating all workers who enjoy the benefits of unions to support the
union financially and otherwise. However, one might then be
surprised to learn that Sweden and Denmark are both more
deferential to individual rights than the United States (at least in the
labor law context), and that, in fact, there is no obligation in either
country to join a union as a condition of employment. Until very
recently, union-security clauses were legally permissible in Sweden
but, in practice, were "virtually nonexistent."' 190 The same holds for
Denmark, where union-member "preference" clauses appeared only
in collective agreements made with the scant group of employers who
were not members of an employers' association (and therefore not
party to an industry or sector agreement).' 9' In 2006, the European
Court of Human Rights declared that union-security agreements were
185. See generally William J. Moore, The Determinants and Effects of Right-to-Work
Laws: A Review of the Recent Literature, 19 J. LAB. RES. 445 (1998) (reviewing the vast
literature published since the 1980s studying the effect of right-to-work legislation on a
number of areas, including unionization, free riding, union organizing activities, and
successes in representation elections, wages, and state industrial development).
186. See id. at 449-53 (reviewing studies finding that right-to-work laws reduce union
density or the likelihood that a worker will be a union member).
187. See, e.g., Joe C. Davis & John H. Huston, Right-to-Work Laws and Free Riding, 31
ECON. INQUIRY 52 passim (1993).
188. Moore, supra note 185, at 450-51.
189. See id.
190. Fahlbeck & Mulder, supra note 104, at 19-54.
191. HASSELBALCH, supra note 115, at 196-97.
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incompatible with the principle of freedom of association under the
European Convention."9 At least partly in response to this decision,
in 2006 the Danish Parliament passed the Act on Protection against
Discrimination Due to Membership or Nonmembership in a Union,
which prohibited union preference clauses in collective agreements. 193
However, the "extreme rarity"194 of union-security clauses in
Swedish and Danish labor agreements cannot be explained by recent
trends in human rights law in the European Union. In fact, the
absence of union security was not originally the result of legislative
prohibition but was instead a product of mutual consent between
unions and employer associations that goes very deep into the
tradition of Nordic labor relations. The banning of the closed shop
dates to the early emergence of collective bargaining in Sweden,
when unions and employers agreed in the 1906 "December
Compromise" that employers would have the right to hire without
regard to union affiliation. 9 5
One, therefore, confronts a rather anomalous result. Right-to-
work legislation and other statutory and judicial restrictions on union-
security agreements almost certainly make it more difficult to
overcome the free-rider problem in the United States. Yet, Denmark
and Sweden are essentially right-to-work countries. How then, do
these two countries overcome the free-rider problem to sustain such
high union densities?
2. The Ghent System and the Free-Rider Problem
As has been argued in other studies of the Ghent system, union-
administered unemployment insurance arguably solves the free-rider
problem for Swedish and Danish unions by furnishing an alternative
"selective incentive" for workers to join a union. 196 In Mancur Olson's
classic study of collective action, he defines a selective incentive as an
incentive that operates discriminately between those who do and do
not contribute to the production of a collective good (or to the groups
192. Fahlbeck & Mulder, supra note 104, at 19-54; see Sorensen & Rasmussen v.
Denmark, 2006-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, 65, 76-77 (2006). Specifically, the court termed the
union-security agreement under discussion as a closed-shop agreement, although it is clear
from the court's discussion that a union shop agreement, which requires an employee to
become a union member after being hired, was the actual form of agreement
contemplated. See id. %% 9-10.
193. See Sand, supra note 113, at 12-28.
194. Fahlbeck & Mulder, supra note 104, at 19-54.
195. Id.; see PETER A. SWENSON, CAPITALISTS AGAINST MARKETS 80-81 (2002).
196. See, e.g., Ebbinghaus & Visser, supra note 48, at 143; Rothstein, supra note 42, at
36-37; Scruggs, supra note 72, at 290-95.
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or organizations that produce them).197 A union-security clause is one
kind of selective incentive in that the employee is threatened with the
loss of a job if she does not join or contribute to the union.1 98 Union-
administered unemployment insurance is another kind of selective
incentive in that, since the unemployment insurance scheme is
voluntary, the worker will only receive the benefit if she joins and
contributes to the program. 199
However, another of the Ghent system's surprises is that a
worker is not required to become a member of a labor union in order
to participate in a union's unemployment insurance plan. Generally,
this is the contemporary rule, although historically unions could
require membership."' How then does the Ghent system actually
encourage union membership and prevent free riding? There are
probably both "negative" and "positive" forms of motivation that
supply the answer to this question. Political scientists have posed the
negative aspect. That is, since unions make the "street level"
determinations of eligibility, participants fear that their union
membership status will influence their chances for receiving
benefits.2°'
In addition to the concerns about being designated ineligible, it
seems likely that workers have more prosaic and positive motivations
for joining unions. For instance, a union-provided service could evoke
a reciprocal incentive for workers to join the union. That is, workers
may be more inclined to join a union, when given a choice, as a way
197. OLSON, supra note 156, at 51.
198. See id. at 66-97.
199. Clasen & Viebrock, supra note 41, at 435-36 (stating that voluntary
unemployment insurance is a "selective incentive" because, unlike wage bargaining,
"which works to the advantage of all workers within a particular industry or region,
unemployment insurance restricts benefits to members only").
200. Id. at 434 (stating that the requirement of dual membership in union and
unemployment insurance fund was abolished). The rule may not have been strictly that
dual membership was required, but that if a worker wanted to join an insurance fund but
not the corresponding union, she would have to pay a higher membership fee. See id. at
440 (reporting that a 1969 reform in Denmark removed the option of unions to charge "up
to 40 per cent higher [insurance-fund] membership fees from members who were not
affiliated to the relevant trade union").
201. See Rothstein, supra note 42, at 40-41 (arguing that a union's ability to determine
what is a "suitable" job-a job whose offer of employment would terminate an
unemployed workers' eligibility for continued benefits-provides a selective incentive in
favor of union membership); Scruggs, supra note 72, at 291-92 (describing how, despite
legal regulation of eligibility requirements, union administration of the funds still gives
union personnel some "street-level" discretion on eligibility claims).
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of repaying it for providing unemployment insurance. °2 On this view,
the voluntary aspect of some Ghent systems would play a key role in
enhancing legitimacy and support for unions and union membership.
Indeed, this could be one reason why the voluntary Ghent systems
(Denmark, Finland, and Sweden) have higher union densities than
the "hybrid," compulsory Ghent system found in Belgium.2 3
However, there could be programmatic differences, such as coverage
and benefit generosity, as well as historical contrasts in labor
organization that would also account for this divergence.
The Ghent system may also reduce some of the transaction costs
of maintaining union membership. Going to the union to enroll in an
insurance plan or collect unemployment benefits may simply make it
much easier to simultaneously join the union since the insurance
funds and unions usually share the same personnel and even are
"often located within the same building. '' 204 Finally, if union
membership historically was required to participate in the plans, a
social norm encouraging union membership may be a legacy of that
rule.205 Thus, the mere fact that unions administer unemployment
insurance probably encourages workers to become union members.
Union-provided unemployment insurance and union-security
agreements are alternative ways of addressing the free-rider problem,
but the effectiveness of union-provided unemployment insurance in
addressing that problem far surpasses that of union-security
agreements. This is because union membership sustained by a union-
security regime is particularly vulnerable in the face of job
turnover.2 6 Under a union security agreement, union membership is
conditioned on being employed in a union-represented bargaining
202. Clasen & Viebrock, supra note 41, at 445-46 (suggesting that joining the
"unemployment insurance fund but not the respective trade union might be regarded as a
sign of disloyalty towards fellow employees and their representation in the local
workplace").
203. For density comparisons, see supra Table 1. On the Belgian Ghent system, see
generally Kurt Vandaele, A Report from the Homeland of the Ghent System, 12
TRANSFER 647 (2006) (discussing the historical development and institutional details of
the Belgian Ghent system, which is compulsory but administered by labor unions).
204. Clasen & Viebrock, supra note 41, at 446.
205. See id. at 445-46 (reporting that, despite the "formal separation between trade
union and insurance fund," there remains a "traditionally strong and widespread
identification" between them).
206. Jelle Visser, Why Fewer Workers Join Unions in Europe: A Social Custom
Explanation of Membership Trends, 40 BRITISH J. INDUS. REL. 403, 418 (2002) (providing
evidence that job turnover reduces membership rates in Europe). Because job turnover
tends to be higher in the United States, the argument would seem to apply with even
greater force.
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unit.2 7 A represented employee's entire relationship to a labor union
will, therefore, typically end when she leaves her job as a result of
being unemployed through dismissal or layoff; when she finds a job
elsewhere and the new workplace is not represented by a union; or
under the current labor law doctrines of successorship, when a
company acquires a formerly union-represented plant and the new
employer is not bound by the former union's bargaining authority. 08
Consequently, labor movements whose memberships are supported
by union security agreements are struck particularly hard during
economic recessions.209 Indeed, union density has fallen to greater
depths as a result of the current economic recession in the United
States. For the first time ever, because of job losses in heavily
unionized industries such as manufacturing, construction, and
transportation, more public sector workers belong to labor unions
than do private sector employees-although private sector
employment dominates the public sector five to one.210
Job turnover has entirely the opposite effect on union density in
the Ghent system. Given that workers are more likely to become
union members when they join an unemployment insurance plan, one
would expect union density to increase whenever workers face an
increasing risk of unemployment. 2 " Indeed, empirical analysis
demonstrates that during business cycles "unionization grew faster
when unemployment increased in the Ghent systems, while it
declined more rapidly as unemployment grew in the non-Ghent
countries."2 12 Likewise, workers are more likely to retain their union
membership when they change jobs in order to enjoy continued
access to unemployment insurance in the future.213
207. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)(i) (2006)
(permitting union-security agreements only where "such labor organization is the
representative of the employees as provided in section 9(a) ... in the appropriate
collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made").
208. See Visser, supra note 206, at 418. On the Supreme Court's doctrine of union
successorship, see generally Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27
(1987).
209. News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Union
Members-2010 1 (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdflunion2.pdf; see
Mike Hall, Job Crisis Takes Toll on Union Membership, AFL-CIO Now BLOG (Jan. 22,
2010), http:/Iblog.aflcio.org/2010/01/22/job-crisis-takes-toll-on-union-membership/.
210. News Release, supra note 209, at 1.
211. WESTERN, supra note 39, at 56.
212. Scruggs, supra note 72, at 289.
213. See id. at 294 (finding that union membership rates among unemployed workers in
two Ghent countries, Belgium and Denmark, are "very high").
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The effect of the Ghent system on union membership across job
transitions acquires an even greater significance as job transitions
become an increasingly important reality in the modern workplace.
Katherine Van Wezel Stone has recently written about the upheaval
in employment relations caused by shorter job tenures, the
dismantling of firms' internal labor markets, and a general move away
from long-term attachments between firms and workers in recent
decades. 14 Accordingly, she writes, "As careers become boundaryless
and work becomes detached from a single employer, unions need to
become boundaryless as well. They need to develop strategies, skills,
and strengths that go beyond single contracts with single employers.
They need to move beyond worksite-based collective bargaining
.... "215 The Ghent system clearly works in this fashion as it forms an
attachment between worker and union that exists independently of
any single employer. Thus, as job transitions have become an even
more prominent feature of the new, boundaryless workplace, so the
salience of the Ghent system increases.
C. The Adversarial Problem
It is common to divide national systems of labor relations into
two types: adversarial and cooperative.216 The distinction is, of course,
hardly discrete, but there seems to be little dispute that the United
States falls into the former category.217 Adversarial relationships are
characterized by the resort to "hard" bargaining, the propensity for
industrial strife, the lack of trust between unions and management,
and in general the tendency for employers to take a "union-
avoidance" strategy in employment relations.218 In cooperative labor
relations, trust and the absence of industrial conflict are more likely
214. See generally KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS:
EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 67-116 (2004)
(documenting and discussing the evidence for a transformation away from long-term, full-
time employment and theorizing the emergence of a new, contingent, and "boundaryless"
employment relationship).
215. Id. at 218.
216. See Jonathan Zeitlin, The Triumph of Adversarial Bargaining: Industrial Relations
in British Engineering, 1880-1939, 18 POL. & Soc'Y 405, 405-09 (1990). The terms
"distributive" and "integrative" bargaining have also been used to describe this
distinction. See RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL
THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS 4-5 (ILR Press 1991) (1965).
217. Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and
Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1388 (1993) (acknowledging the United
States' "adversarial mode of industrial pluralism ... hardened during and after World War
II").
218. See Zeitlin, supra note 216, at 405-09.
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to prevail.219 Employers are more likely to view unions as playing an
essential, contributing role in the governance of labor, and as "social
partners" with whom they are engaged in a "social dialogue. ' 221 It is
more difficult to grow union membership in adversarial
environments. Adversarial employment relations make the
recognition problem harder because employers are more likely to
seek an exit from a union relationship and avoid a union presence in
the workplace altogether. Adversarial relationships also reduce the
attractiveness of union membership. 221 As contrasting examples of
this approach to union-management relations, this Part examines the
reactions of unions in the United States and Scandinavia to
employers' recent drives toward more "flexible" governance practices
in the workplace.
1. Comparative Analysis: Cooperation and Workplace Flexibility
The findings and policies of the NLRA state:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of
employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards
commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and
promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized
sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices
fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes
arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working
conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power
between employers and employees.222
This broad principle of using the law to encourage the "friendly
adjustment" of disputes and to remove "sources of industrial strife" is
found pervasively throughout American labor law. At every stage of
219. See id. at 406.
220. Both unions and employer associations in Denmark use language like "social
partners" and "social dialogue." See, e.g., CO-INDUSTRI, FLEXICURITY: A DANISH TRADE
UNION VIEW 12-13, 16-18, 26, 30 (2007), available at http://www.lo.dk/english%20version
/-/media/LO/English/Congress2007/Flexicurity%20%20%20a%2ODanish%20trade%20u
nion%20view.ashx.
221. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 84, 85
fig.3.8 (1999) (finding that 63% of workers would prefer to have a representational
organization that "management cooperated with in discussing issues, but had no power to
make decisions," while 22% would prefer an organization "that had more power, but
management opposed"; union-member workers gave almost identical responses).
222. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). Senator Wagner also
hoped that cooperative labor relations would result from his legislation. See Barenberg,
supra note 217, at 1390 ("Wagner's quasi-utopian mission was to 'build[] ... a cooperative
order' designed to reintegrate a class-riven society and to replace or at least legitimate
asymmetric power relations.").
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the collective bargaining process-from the organization of workers,
recognition of the union, and the employer's duty to bargain with the
union, to interpretation and enforcement of the collective-bargaining
agreement-legal procedures are available as substitutes to the use of
strikes, lockouts, or other forms of economic "self help. 223
Yet, despite this broad policy goal of the NLRA, labor relations
in the United States typify the adversarial model. As an example of
the adversarial model in action, consider employers' recent drive
toward greater flexibility in the workplace. With substantial changes
in work organization and an increasingly competitive global economy,
employers in the United States have sought to move their
employment practices away from the traditional internal-labor-
market ("ILM") model.224 The ILM model included employer and
employee investment in firm-specific training, seniority-based pay
and layoff policies, implicit employment guarantees (and, in union
environments, explicit guarantees for dismissals only for "just
cause"), narrowly defined job classifications, and other rules and
agreements promoting long-term attachments between firms and
employees. 225 Firms now seek to link pay and tenure with
performance, hire workers who acquire their own broad-based
portfolio of skills and competencies, and refrain from making long-
term employment guarantees.226 However, labor unions in the United
States have been slow to adapt themselves, if at all, to the new, post-
ILM environment. Unions continue to press for traditional ILM
"rigidities, ' 227 while management candidly expresses its desire to
avoid a union presence for fear of losing "control" of the
workplace. 228 As a result, employers have imposed workplace
flexibility unilaterally, without the input of unions, often in opposition
to unions, and even by removing them from the workplace altogether.
223. Matthew Dimick, Revitalizing Union Democracy: Labor Law, Bureaucracy, and
Workplace Association, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 33-38 (2010); Fahlbeck, supra note 26, at
311 (referring to the "the heavy dose of government intervention in the labor market that
is characteristic of U.S. labor law").
224. See STONE, supra note 214, at 67-116 (2004) (documenting and explaining the
transformation of the employment relationship during the past three decades).
225. Id. at 53-63 (discussing the theory of internal labor markets).
226. Id. at 87-99 (specifying elements of the "new employment relationship").
227. Id. at 196-216 (exploring tensions between unionism and the "boundaryless"
workplace).
228. Alec MacGillis, Union Bill's Declining Chances Give Rise to Alternatives, WASH.
POST, Mar. 29, 2009, at A5 (expressing employers' belief that passage of EFCA would
"force them to give up control over how they run their business").
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It is possible (and common) to view the NLRA as occupying the
governance side of the governance-regulation spectrum since it is
short on specifying substantive labor standards and merely governs
the process establishing and supervising collective-bargaining
relationships.229 Yet, when viewed against Scandinavian labor law, the
NLRA looks decidedly regulatory.3 ° Parts II.A and II.B of this
Article have already examined the limited role of Danish and
Swedish labor law addressing the recognition and free-rider
problems. However, the extent of self-regulation goes further, where
even the process governing the establishment and supervision of
collective bargaining is largely the result of private agreements
between unions and employers. Writing about Denmark, for
example, Ole Krarup states:
The whole system is almost totally based upon the collective
agreements made by the parties themselves. Not only the
concrete rights and duties in the industrial relations (payment
and working conditions), but the normative system itself-that
is to say the regulation of the terms of establishing the concrete
agreements for the labour market (which in other countries
have been created through legislation)-is a result of collective
bargaining. Even the legislation by which the Labour Court
(which is a state court) was established was derived from the
parties' agreements.231
This view holds for Sweden as well, particularly from a historical
perspective, where it is clear that the Swedish trade unions frequently
eschewed the opportunity to seek implementation of more extensive
labor legislation. 23 2 In the absence of a legislative framework for
industrial peace, one might think that demands by Nordic employers
229. Estlund, supra note 34, at 1528-29.
230. It is interesting that a Swede is one of the few legal scholars to observe that
American labor law has a "heavy dose of government intervention." See Fahlbeck, supra
note 26, at 311. In contrast, American scholars view the NLRA as relying, perhaps
inordinately, on a high level of "private ordering." See Estlund, supra note 34, at 1528-29
(describing American collective bargaining as a "third way" between "individual contract"
and "regulation"); Fisk, supra note 27, at 152 (explaining that the "heart of American
labor law is... private agreement").
231. Ole Krarup, Free Bargaining or State Coercion? Labour Conciliation in Denmark,
in REFLEXIVE LABOUR LAW: STUDIES IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND EMPLOYMENT
REGULATION 301, 302 (Ralf Rogowski & Ton Wilthagen eds., .994); see Scheuer, supra
note 122, at 149-51.
232. SCHMIDT, supra note 111, at 31 (expressing the preference of unions and
employer associations for solving problems through collective agreement and their
"mutual desire to avoid public interference" as "characteristic feature[s] of the history of
labour relations in Sweden"); see Kjellberg, supra note 122, at 79-80.
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for workplace "flexibilization" would collide violently with powerful
labor unions. 233
One may then again be surprised to learn that employment
relations in these countries have remained largely peaceful and, in
Denmark particularly, unions have accommodated themselves to a
remarkable level of workplace flexibility. Employers in Denmark
enjoy an ease in hiring and firing that is among the least restrictive in
Europe .2 1 Further, Denmark has a level of job mobility that rivals
that of the United States and other liberal market economies. Job
turnover is surprisingly high, with about thirty percent of the
workforce changing jobs each year.235 Job tenure in Denmark is also
relatively low, with average lengths closer to the United States and
the United Kingdom than to the much longer average job tenures in
Greece, Italy, Japan, or Portugal.236
Flexibility has also historically characterized the Swedish labor
market, although this has changed since the late 1970s. Originally, the
Swedish employment relationship was at-will.237 Also as part of the
1906 December Compromise mentioned above, the famous
"Paragraph 23" of the written accord gave employers the
untrammeled right to hire or fire.2 38 Decisions of the Swedish Labor
Court in subsequent decades attest to the breadth of managerial
discretion in this area.23 9 Hence for decades, labor markets in Sweden
were remarkably flexible: "The official goal of Swedish Social
Democracy in the 1950s and 1960s was to provide for 'security in the
labor market,' as distinct from 'job security.' "140 Indeed, labor market
policy in these decades explicitly aimed at enhancing the mobility of
233. In Britain, the debilitating degree of strike activity in the 1960s was alleged to be
caused in part by the lack of a formal legal framework for industrial relations. See Robert
Kilroy-Silk, The Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, 22
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 544, 544, 550, 556 (1969) (conveying the findings of British
Commissioners that the voluntary, informal, and autonomous nature of the British system
of industrial relations was the cause of unofficial strikes).
234. Per Kongshoj Madsen, The Danish Model of "Flexicurity": Experiences and
Lessons, 10 TRANSFER 187, 192 (2004).
235. Id. at 190-91.
236. Id. at 191.
237. Alan C. Neal, Employment Protection Laws: The Swedish Model, 33 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 634, 638-39 (1984).
238. SWENSON, supra note 195, at 80-81.
239. RICHARD B. PETERSON, THE SWEDISH LABOR COURT VIEWS MANAGEMENT
RIGHTS 29 (1968) (detailing the breadth of employers' right to hire and fire, irrespective
of length of service or the individual competence of the employee, which are key variables
when considering "just cause" for dismissal for employees working under collective
agreements in the United States).
240. JONAS PONTUSSON, INEQUALITY AND PROSPERITY 125 (2005).
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workers across firms and sectors.24' Employment protection was
legislated only in the 1970s as a reaction to severe industrial
adjustment problems. 42 Despite increased levels of employment
protection, even today the Swedish labor market appears to rely on
the external, rather than the internal, labor market for hiring,
training, retraining, placement, and a variety of other employment
practices.243
What do unions and workers receive for such little job
protection, currently in Denmark, and historically in Sweden? Unlike
the United States, workplace flexibility has not been the result of a
unilateral imposition by employers in the context of an adversarial
form of labor relations. Rather, as the next Section will argue, unions
have been able to trade job protection away for generous
unemployment insurance, both in a context of cooperative labor
relations and as a "mutual gains" strategy that enhances such
cooperation.
2. The Ghent System, Cooperation, and Employment Security
Lower levels of employment protection-currently in Denmark,
historically in Sweden-do not imply that workers are left without
any form of security. Unemployment insurance, when provided at
generous enough levels, plays a key role in underwriting workers'
consent to a flexible labor market. In the Danish system, the
employer's freedom to hire and fire is explicitly linked to the robust
unemployment insurance guarantee in its vaunted program of
flexicurity.2 4 Hence, just as the official slogan of Swedish Social
Democracy proclaimed in the 1950s and 1960s, Denmark's model of
flexicurity is described as providing "employment security, not job
security." 245
As a consequence, unemployment insurance serves as a labor
market substitute to job protection regulation. At around 70%,
241. SWENSON, supra note 195, at 274-75 (describing the development of "active labor
market polic[ies]," such as subsidies for job retraining and geographic relocation, as efforts
to "promot[e] mobility" and "enhance workers' freedom by increasing their ability to
change jobs").
242. PONTUSSON, supra note 240, at 125-26.
243. Fahlbeck & Mulder, supra note 104, at 13.
244. Madsen, supra note 234, at 189 (including employment flexibility as one of the
three critical elements, along with generous unemployment benefits and active labor
market policies, that constitute the "golden triangle" of flexicurity).
245. Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Flexicurity, PATHWAYS, Spring 2009, at 10, 12,
available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/scspiLmedia/pdf/pathways/spring-2 00 9
/CohenSabel.pdf.
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Denmark has one of the highest average replacement rates-the
percentage of the unemployed worker's former wage that is paid in
unemployment benefits-among OECD countries.246 In the United
States, the average replacement rate is 36%.247 While greater
flexibility for the employer arguably contributes to higher mobility
and shorter tenures for employees, the adoption of flexicurity has also
contributed to a fall in the unemployment rate (from 9.6% in 1993 to
4.3% in 2001248 and 1.7% in 2008249) and an increase in the
employment rate to 75%, one of the highest in the OECD.5 ° More
importantly, despite greater mobility and shorter tenures, Danish
workers do not feel greater insecurity. According to two different
surveys, from 1996 and 2000, Danish workers do not report very high
levels of insecurity, and, in fact, the proportion of Danish workers
feeling insecure is "considerably lower than for all the other countries
in the sample," which presumably includes other European countries
with much higher levels of employment protection legislation.
51
Arguably, the level of benefits provided by unemployment insurance
contributes to this sense of security, as does the higher job mobility
rate and lower unemployment rate, which makes it easier to find or
switch jobs and reduces the length of the unemployment spell.
Finally, and most crucially, the Danish combination of flexible
employment relations and generous unemployment benefits arguably
generates efficiency gains that underwrite greater trust and
cooperation between employers and unions. Flexibility enhances
workplace productivity by allowing employers to select and retain the
most productive workers for the job. Generous unemployment
benefits improve workers' welfare by cushioning the blow of job loss.
Greater workplace productivity also redounds to the benefit of
employees as workers share in productivity gains through collectively
bargained wage and benefit increases. Addressing these matters
through collective bargaining, rather than through legislation, also
helps strike a more efficient agreement. 2 ' Direct collective bargaining
246. Madsen, supra note 234, at 193-94.
247. LORI G. KLETZER & HOWARD F. ROSEN, BROOKINGS INST., REFORMING
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY WORKPLACE 12
(2006), available at http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/200609kletzer-rosen.pdf.
248. Madsen, supra note 234, at 188.
249. Liz Alderman, Denmark Starts Trimming Its Admired Safety Net, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 17, 2010, at B4.
250. Madsen, supra note 234, at 190.
251. Id. at 192.
252. Ton Wilthagen & Frank Tros, The Concept of "Flexicurity": A New Approach to
Regulating Employment and Labour Markets, 10 TRANSFER 166, 178-79 (2004) (arguing
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between employers and unions over a range of employment-related
matters offers a greater opportunity for making tradeoffs and
compromises.2 53 Employment policy does not become a legislative
lobbying war over narrow, zero-sum matters of, for instance,
employment protection or minimum wages. All of these efficiencies
create the "mutual gains" that make greater trust and cooperation
possible.254
III. LEARNING FROM THE GHENT SYSTEM
What normative conclusions can be drawn from the preceding
comparative analysis of the NLRA and the Ghent system? Applying
any policy lesson from the Scandinavian experience to the vastly
different American context may seem like a prospect fraught with
difficulties. Without ignoring these concerns, this Part suggests that
more possibilities are open than may at first be presumed. First, the
federal Social Security Act, which establishes unemployment
insurance in the United States, creates a cooperative federal-state
program that allocates funding responsibility to the federal
government and authority to the states for administration of benefits
and the establishment of eligibility criteria. Accordingly, a strategy of
"progressive-federalist" reform appears possible. Second, labor
unions can draw on the Ghent system experience themselves without
requiring legislative change, either state or federal. The Ghent
system, after all, is a modern version of union "mutual aid";255 mutual
aid is part of a self-help philosophy that has pervaded the history and
practice of the American labor movement as much as any other. To
demonstrate such Ghent-type, mutual aid possibilities, this Part will
also discuss several contemporary and domestic examples of
traditional and nontraditional labor unions that instantiate, in greater
or lesser degrees, Ghent-type principles.
that flexicurity tradeoffs are more likely where there are "corporatist systems or other
traditions of social partnership, consultation and coordination" between unions and
employers).
253. Id. at 179 (discussing how extending the scope of collective bargaining can
increase the range of possible tradeoffs between flexibility and security).
254. Id. (arguing that the greater likelihood of reaching agreements enables "mutual
gains to be achieved and a more optimal way of dealing with the double requirement of
flexibility and security").
255. SAMUEL BACHARACH, PETER A. BAMBERGER & WILLIAM J. SONNENSTUHL,
MUTUAL AID AND UNION RENEWAL 35-36 (2001).
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A. A Progressive-Federalist Strategy for Union Revitalization
As was shown above, the positive effects of the Ghent system on
union density are distinguishable from cultural causes, and the
adoption of the Ghent system is not the product of an already strong
labor movement. In fact, the benefits of increased union membership
were unanticipated by most of the young labor movements that
implemented them.256 Only in the case of Sweden do the advantages
seem to have been foreseen, and there the Ghent system was adopted
to secure the future growth and security of the labor movement, not
to consolidate already accumulated union membership gains.257 Thus,
union-administered unemployment insurance holds tremendous
promise as an institutional basis for revitalizing union strength.
One reason the Ghent system can be imported into the United
States is that the federal social security system gives states broad
latitude to design and administer their programs. Under the Social
Security Act, federal law encourages states to create their own
programs while broadly permitting them to determine the
requirements for eligibility as well as the amount and duration of the
benefits.25 8 Concerns about constitutionality drove the framers of the
Social Security Act to create a cooperative federal-state program
rather than a purely federal program. 9 Therefore, these broad
principles of the Act appear consistent with state-level changes in
administration and eligibility determination that would permit
adoption of a Ghent system arrangement.
256. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
257. See Rothstein, supra note 42, at 46-51 (detailing the legislative history of the
Ghent system in Sweden).
258. Amy B. Chasanov, Clarifying Conditions for Nonmonetary Eligibility in the
Unemployment Insurance System, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 89, 89 (1996) (describing the
American unemployment insurance program as "a federal-state program, where each
state determines its own eligibility requirements with only minimal requirements imposed
by the federal government"); see also Kenneth M. Casebeer, Unemployment Insurance:
American Social Wage, Labor Organization and Legal Ideology, 35 B.C. L. REV. 259, 314
(1994) (explaining that the Social Security Act "does not set up a federal system," but
rather "create[s] incentives for states to establish their own unemployment compensation
plans, but leave[s] the questions of who contributes to the fund, the amount and duration
of the benefits, and requirements for eligibility completely in the hands of the states").
259. Wilbur J. Cohen, The Development of the Social Security Act of 1935, 68 MINN. L.
REV. 379, 399-403 (1983) (stating that the "need to create an Act that would survive any
constitutional challenge directly influenced the shape and content of the Social Security
Act," including its cooperative federal-state design); see also EDWIN E. WITTE, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 111-21 (1963) (presenting the debates
among social security architects and administrators over whether the unemployment
compensation provisions of the social security bill should establish an exclusively federal
or a cooperative federal-state system).
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A U.S. version of the Ghent system can therefore constitute a
"progressive-federalist" strategy of union revitalization. 260 Such an
alternative offers promise since Congress is arguably the largest
obstacle to labor law reform.261 Outside of Congress, in the agencies
or states, federal labor law reform is likewise hampered because
rulemaking at the NLRB has become ossified and because federal
labor law preempts reformation at the state level.2 2 However, since
unemployment insurance falls outside the purview of federal labor
law, new reform possibilities are available. 63 Strategically, unions can
promote the Ghent system in states where unions are strongest and
most highly regarded. Following those successes, with renewed vigor
and image, unions could then begin to advance in territory where they
have been less welcome.
While the federalist principles of the Social Security Act would
appear to accommodate the adoption of state-level Ghent plans, the
text of the Social Security Act places significant constraints on states'
design of unemployment insurance systems. The first, and perhaps
most important, textual issue is whether states would be allowed to let
labor unions administer unemployment insurance. Sections 303(a)(1)
and (2) of the Social Security Act establish that the Secretary of
Labor will not certify payments of federal funds to states unless states
provide "[s]uch methods of administration ... as are found by the
Secretary of Labor to be reasonably calculated to insure full payment
of unemployment compensation when due" and "[p]ayment of
260. On the idea of a "progressive federalism," see Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers,
The Promise of Progressive Federalism, in REMAKING AMERICA: DEMOCRACY AND
PUBLIC POLICY IN AN AGE OF INEQUALITY 205 (Joe Soss et al. eds., 2007).
261. See Estlund, supra note 34, at 1530.
262. Id. at 1530-31.
263. The general rule under the NLRA is that states may not regulate conduct that is
"arguably" protected or prohibited under federal law. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council
v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959). Traditionally, labor law scholars have
"consistently expounded the view that states should never be free to enforce laws that
reflect 'an accommodation of the special interests of employers, unions, employees or the
public in employee self-organization, collective bargaining, or labor disputes.'" Michael
Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State Laws Facilitating Unionization, 7
YALE J. ON REG. 355, 355 n.2 (1990) (quoting Archibald Cox, Labor Law Preemption
Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337, 1356 (1972)). Since an American Ghent system would
"arguably" "accommodate" unions' interests in recruiting members, this would raise a
preemption concern. However, precisely in the unemployment insurance context, the
Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the general preemption rule because
Congress has indicated that it intended states to have free choice over eligibility
requirements for unemployment insurance. See N.Y. Tel. Co. v. N.Y. Dep't of Labor, 440
U.S. 519, 544 (1979) ("The omission of any direction concerning payment to strikers...
implies that Congress intended that the States be free to authorize, or to prohibit, such
payments.").
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unemployment compensation solely through public employment
offices or such other agencies as the Secretary of Labor may approve
.... "264 The legislative history suggests that the meaning of "such
other agencies" was open to interpretation. The original bill required
that compensation be paid through public employment offices. 265 This
language was qualified in the Senate version by adding "to the extent
that such offices exist and are designated by the state for the
purpose. ' 266 The conference committee revised the language into its
present form.267
Furthermore, the phrase "public employment offices" did not
refer to public agencies designed specifically for administering
unemployment benefits. Public employment offices were promoted
by the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933268 and were intended to provide
job referral and other employment services that "bear no relation to
the administration of an unemployment compensation law. ' 269 No
case law appears to construe the meaning of "such other agencies,"
but according to one attorney general's opinion, the "statute does not
prescribe any particular form of State organization . "...270 Thus,
while it is doubtful that nonpublic agencies were actually ever
contemplated as possible forms of administration, the statutory
language does not appear to prohibit such alternatives.
Since most Ghent systems are voluntary,27 1 and because this
voluntary component may play an important role,272 a second
important textual issue is whether states would be allowed to adopt
this feature. That is, if labor unions were allowed to administer
publicly financed unemployment insurance, could states require
beneficiaries to join and make minimal contributions to a labor-run
plan before benefits could be collected? The statutory language
suggests some challenges, stating that "compensation shall not be
denied to any individual by reason of cancellation of wage credits or
total reduction of his benefit rights for any cause other than discharge
for misconduct connected with his work, fraud in connection with a
264. Social Security Act § 303(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
265. WITTE, supra note 259, at 135.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 135-36.
268. Fin. of State Pub. Emp't Offices Under Section 302(a) of the Soc. Sec. Act, 39 Op.
Att'y Gen. 229, 231-32 (1941).
269. Id. at 231.
270. U.S. Emp't Serv.-Approval of State Emp't Serv. Plans, 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 181,
184 (1941).
271. See supra text accompanying note 42.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 202-03.
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claim for compensation, or receipt of disqualifying income. "273
Clearly, benefits cannot be entirely conditioned on workers
participating in a voluntary unemployment insurance plan.
Given this language, architects of an American Ghent system
might contemplate two alternatives. First, voluntariness, as the case of
Belgium demonstrates, is not an essential characteristic of the Ghent
system.274 A state may thus be able to adopt a "hybrid" Ghent system,
while remaining aware that its impact on union membership rates
may be weaker. Alternatively, states might be able to adopt a
voluntary system alongside a compulsory one. Since the statutory
language only prohibits "total reduction" of benefits,275 states could
offer less generous benefits to all workers, while granting more
generous benefits to workers who joined a union-run insurance fund.
Indeed, most Ghent countries appear to offer such alternative
minimum benefits to workers who are not part of a union-run plan or
whose benefits expire or are terminated for other reasons.276
While the two most important textual issues are union
administration and plan voluntariness, many other details about an
American version of the Ghent system should be considered. It is not
this author's intention to fully explore those details in this Article, but
a few matters are worth mentioning. For example, to allay fears about
financial impropriety, state governments should establish a set of
regulations setting forth criteria under which union insurance plans
can be licensed to receive public funds.2 7 7 An important element in
that arrangement should require labor unions to establish financially
segregated unemployment insurance plans. Another issue is the
institutional locus for fund establishment. Following Ghent practice,
funds should not be created at an overly decentralized level but
rather organized by industry or occupation. Alternatively, given the
federal structure an American Ghent system might follow, funds
could be created at the state level. The AFL-CIO already has labor
councils organized at the state level and, given their "general"
jurisdiction and responsibility for workers in all sectors of the
economy, they seem to be well suited for administering such plans.
273. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(10) (2006).
274. See supra text accompanying note 44.
275. § 3304(a)(10).
276. See, e.g., Madsen, supra note 234, at 193-97 (describing how workers are able to
receive less generous social assistance when they have exhausted their unemployment
benefits under the entitlement period).
277. A system of regulation through licensure is how the Ghent system is typically
organized. See Rothstein, supra note 42, at 48.
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B. Domestic Examples of Ghent-Type Governance
Applying Ghent system insights is not limited to state-subsidized
unemployment insurance, although such subsidies certainly increase
the effectiveness of these programs. Drawing on their own resources
and experiences, labor unions can fashion similar benefits on their
own. Indeed, such "mutual aid" strategies of encouraging union
membership and building networks of solidarity among workers have
been a prominent feature of the history and practice of the American
labor movement. Following a discussion of mutual aid and a
generalization of the Ghent system, this Section will also evaluate
several contemporary examples of innovation within the labor
movement that have certain Ghent-type features. It remains for the
labor movement to consolidate and expand these experiments in
order to more fully capitalize on their potential.
1. A Return to Mutual Aid?
Historically, the provision of benefits such as unemployment
insurance was one way unions, in the United States and elsewhere,
initially attracted and retained new members. Early British trade
unions were often established first as "friendly societies" and only
later became collective-bargaining organizations.278 Speaking of the
American labor movement's mutual aid benefits, Samuel Gompers,
the first president of the American Federation of Labor, wrote:
I saw clearly that we had to do something to make it worthwhile
to maintain continuous membership, for a union that could hold
members only during a strike could not be a permanent
constructive and conserving force in industrial life.... An out-
of-work benefit, provisions for sickness and death appealed to
me. Participation in such beneficent undertakings would
undoubtedly hold members even when payment of dues might
be a hardship. 79
Accordingly, the notions of self-help and mutual aid have been
central organizing principles for U.S. labor unions and were
"instrumental in the coalescence of the American labor
movement." 80
Viewed in the light of mutual aid, it is possible to generalize
about the Ghent system. Thus, a social program based on the Ghent
278. SIDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, THE HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM 22-23 &
n.1 (1907).
279. BACHARACH ET AL., supra note 255, at 36.
280. Id. at 35.
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model would exhibit at least three characteristics. First, in addition to
the collective goods unions provide to workers-that is, those benefits
that workers receive regardless of affiliation or the choice of
participation-they should also aspire to produce and deliver private
benefits from which nonparticipants can be excluded. This aspect
would address the free-rider problem. While the preceding analysis
has shown why unemployment insurance is a good, possibly ideal,
benefit to offer, union-provided private benefits need not be limited
to this example. Unions could provide health insurance, job training
or retraining, legal advice, consumer discounts, or any number of
possibilities. Second, while nonparticipants should be excludable, such
benefits emphatically should not be exclusive. That is, they should be
generally available to all workers so long as they choose to participate
and not be limited to labor market "insiders," like those employees
who receive benefits because they are fortunate enough to be
members of a bargaining unit at a workplace exclusively represented
by a labor union. This aspect of the program would seek to draw in as
many workers as possible and would help unions create the critical
mass required to overcome the recognition problem. Finally, such
programs ought to simultaneously serve the needs not only of
employees but also of employers. This feature of the program would
address the adversarial problem. The actual Ghent system exhibits
just one other criterion: where possible to obtain it, public
subsidization will also enhance the attractiveness and effectiveness of
these benefits. Where tax financing cannot be obtained, it may be
possible to secure employer funding as will be illustrated below.
To some extent, the mutual aid philosophy remains a core
feature of traditional labor unions. Unions played a well-known role
in constructing the so-called employer-based welfare state by
negotiating with employers for health and pension benefits and funds.
Yet such benefits remain privileges, not even of union members, but
of only those workers who are (or were for a long enough period)
members of a Board-certified bargaining unit.
Nevertheless, other contemporary examples of efforts exist that
exhibit, in greater or lesser degree, these components of the Ghent
system. These examples are considered and evaluated next.
2. The Freelancers Union
The Freelancers Union ("Union") is a non-profit organization
that seeks to represent the needs and interests of "independent"
workers: freelancers, consultants, and independent contractors, as
well as temporary, part-time, contingent, and self-employed
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workers.28 The Union has nearly 100,000 members in New York
State, where it was started in 2003, and almost 150,000 members
nationwide. 82 The Union's primary function is to provide benefits to
its members: health, dental, life, and disability insurance, as well as
retirement plans.283 As of 2007, more than 14,000 freelancers in New
York had bought the Union's health insurance, "generally for about
$300 a month, some 40 percent below what they would normally pay
elsewhere. '' 28 By virtue of its membership, the Union is able to use its
group purchasing power to negotiate discounted rates for these
benefits. Membership in the Union is free, while the organization
finances itself by earning modest commissions on the benefits its
members purchase.2 85 The group benefits are available to any
independent worker.286 Since the benefits come from the union,
rather than the employer, they are portable across the freelancer's
current employment arrangement.
In addition to providing these benefits, the Freelancers Union
seeks to foster community, collaboration, and knowledge sharing by
establishing networks among members through seminars, workshops,
and events. 87 It also engages in advocacy through research and
representation in legislative and policymaking fora.288 However, it
does not bargain with employers, which is a key aspect distinguishing
it from traditional labor unions. 289 Nevertheless, the Freelancers
Union is clearly a union in a more traditional sense: a mutual aid or
281. For more information about the Freelancers Union, see About Us, FREELANCERS
UNION, http://www.freelancersunion.org/about/index.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2012).
282. Id.
283. What We Do, FREELANCERS UNION, http://www.freelancersunion.org/about/what
-we-do.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2012).
284. Steven Greenhouse, Labor Union, Redefined, for Freelance Workers, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 27, 2007, at All.
285. Id.
286. The Freelancers Union website states:
You're good to go if you're a freelancer, an independent contractor, a temporary
worker who gets work through an employment agency, self-employed, employed
part-time, or working for multiple companies at the same time. You can't, at the
time you submit this application, work full-time (at least 35 hours per week) as a
W-2 employee, unless you 1) work for an employment agency or payroll service,
or 2) are hired to work for 18 months or less.
How to Apply, FREELANCERS UNION, http://www.freelancersunion.org/benefitshow-to-
apply.html (last visited Jan 1, 2012).
287. Greenhouse, supra note 284.
288. Id.
289. The Freelancers Union does not aspire to collectively bargain with employers,
although some members prefer that it would. See id.
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friendly society.2 90 Traditional unions are studying the progress of the
Freelancers Union to determine whether its ideas can be borrowed.2 9'
The Freelancers Union's provision of health and other benefits
thus fulfills many of the Ghent-type criteria. Benefits are private, and
this fact certainly reduces free riding on the Freelancers Union's
collective advocacy efforts. At the same time, benefits are available to
all freelance workers, not just to those who have voted for a union in
a representation election. The enhanced portability of benefits
probably benefits employers by keeping talent in the industry, if not
at the particular employer, where presumably short-term
relationships are preferred. The only real differences are the absence
of direct financial subsidies and the lack of collective-bargaining
representation. By adding that final element to a similar benefit
scheme, traditional labor unions could invent a new role for
themselves as well as an entirely different way of building
relationships with workers.
3. Working America
A somewhat similar program to the Freelancers Union comes
from within the mainstream labor movement. This is "Working
America,"292 the AFL-CIO's "associate membership"'2 93 organizing
effort initiated in conjunction with its "Union Plus" program.9 4
Begun in the 1990s, this program "offered unorganized workers and
unemployed members a reduced form of membership. 2 95 Associate
members pay lower dues and are eligible through Union Plus for
certain benefits, such as low-interest credit cards, health care, legal
services, and a variety of other consumer discounts.296
Like the Freelancers Union and the Ghent system, the benefits
provided under the Union Plus program are private and generally
available to all workers, giving workers some incentive to become
associate union members rather than free riding. In fact, two-thirds of
those contacted by Working America organizers joined the
organization. 297 And after three years of operation, Working America
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Richard B. Freeman & M. Marit Rehavi, Helping Workers Online and Offline:
Innovations in Union and Worker Organization Using the Internet 6 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13850, 2008).
293. STONE, supra note 214, at 218.
294. Freeman & Rehavi, supra note 292, at 13.
295. STONE, supra note 214, at 217-18.
296. Id. at 218; Freeman & Rehavi, supra note 292, at 13.
297. Freeman & Rehavi, supra note 292, at 10.
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had two million members, "making it one of the fastest growing
groups in US labor history. '298 Nevertheless, Working America faces
some substantial limitations. First, being administered by the AFL-
CIO itself, the Union Plus benefits may be located at too high an
institutional level. At this level, it is too difficult to use the incoming
membership as a way to form a union nucleus in an industry or
occupation, let alone in a workplace, as a way of overcoming the
recognition problem. Moreover, the provision of benefits is
unconnected with collective bargaining or other employer
relationships that could address the adversarial problem. Rather,
Working America is in many ways more similar to a political lobbying
organization, such as AARP.299 A second problem is that the array of
benefits provided may be too broad and shallow to attract and retain
most workers. 300 A more concentrated and focused benefit, such as
unemployment insurance, may be more effective.
4. Unions as Workforce Intermediaries
A variety of nonprofit and public organizations have emerged in
recent decades to address the lack of opportunities for employees at
the bottom of the labor market, as well as the dearth of access and
advancement for those in slightly better employment conditions,
while serving the needs of both workers and employers.3°'
A central focus of many of these intermediaries is on skills and
training. As just one example, consider the Culinary & Hospitality
Academy of Las Vegas ("CHA"). Established in 1993 by a
consortium of local hotel casinos and unions to provide job training to
union members, the CHA has had marked success in lowering
turnover and training costs for employers.0 2 For workers, training is
free (the CHA is funded almost entirely by employer contributions),
and employment prospects following training are high, since
employers treat the CHA as their main source of entry-level hiring
(even nonunion employers seek to hire academy trainees).'
Like the Ghent system, the union plays a crucial role in providing
and coordinating a tangible benefit for workers (both skills and high
298. Id. at 10-11.
299. Id. at 10; STONE, supra note 214, at 218.
300. Freeman & Rehavi, supra note 292, at 11,13 (noting that membership attrition is a
problem in Working America and that Working America treats the Union Plus benefits as
"minor add-ons rather than selling points of membership").
301. Dresser & Rogers, supra note 38, at 266.
302. Id. at 277-78.
303. Id.
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employment prospects). Since the CHA works closely with the
union's hiring hall, the provision of the benefit helps reduce the free-
rider problem. Because "everyone qualifies" for "the training, the
benefit is open and serves as a constant source of recruitment for new
union members. The constant flow of new members sustains density
and hence recognition in the industry.31 Employer subsidization of
the program serves as an analog to state subsidization in the Ghent
system. The benefits to employers increase the joint gains that help
sustain trust and cooperation.
In this case, the absence of public finance subsidies is the only
major difference from a Ghent-type arrangement. Its success should
encourage unions to undertake similar efforts elsewhere.
5. Worker Centers
The final example of a Ghent-type experiment in the American
labor market probably shares the least similarity with the Ghent
system. Workers' rights centers ("worker centers") can also be
considered nontraditional labor organizations.3 5 Worker centers have
a community orientation, often representing immigrant workers, and
engaging in advocacy, service, and organizing activities, frequently
asserting claims for wage-and-hour violations.3 6 As the name
indicates, there is perhaps a greater emphasis on the vindication of
substantive rights than on the provision of benefits in order to mold
incentives for achieving other representational objectives. Indeed,
within the labor and employment "New Governance" literature,
worker centers have been construed primarily as private forms of
regulatory enforcement.3 7 This is a governance solution, as opposed
to a regulatory one, in the sense that private organizations have
stepped in to fill an enforcement void left by the state.
Nevertheless, worker centers often also provide benefits
generally to a defined group of workers, and as such, bear a similarity
to the Ghent system. There is substantial variation in the kind of
benefits that worker centers dispense. At a minimum, most worker
304. It is interesting to note that Nevada is the only right-to-work state with union
density above the national rate. Union density in the United States was 11.9% in 2010 and
union density in Nevada was 15% in 2010. News Release, supra note 209, at tbl.5. At
11.4%, Iowa is the right-to-work state with the next highest union density. Id. A list of
right-to-work states can be found at Right to Work States, supra note 179.
305. See generally JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS (2006) (detailing the history of
worker centers).
306. Id. at 2.
307. ESTLUND, REGOVERNING, supra note 9, at 106-07, 181-85.
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centers help inform and educate workers about their legal rights. °8
Others are more ambitious and provide both job training and job
placement services to workers.30 9
Yet, while such services may be an attraction to workers, worker
centers may provide them in a self-limiting way, since it is not often
clear that workers are expected to contribute anything in return.31
Thus, such service provisions may fail to surmount the free-rider
problem or generate a sustainable membership base.311 This seems a
consequence of worker centers' orientation toward "justice" rather
than mutual aid. This is not to say that unions or worker centers
should refrain from such orientations, but rather that an exclusive
focus on remedying workplace injustices may neglect another role of
labor organizations-the provision of mutual aid.
C. Toward a New Labor Movement
Incorporating Ghent-type and mutual aid principles back into
the labor movement can have potentially enormous transformative
effects. Through a Ghent-type system, labor unions provide a benefit
that is available to all workers, not conditioned on being a member of
a government-certified bargaining unit, and not conditioned on
securing a victory in an NLRB certification election. The labor
movement will thus gain a presence in the economy and labor market
as a whole and not be condemned to merely represent those few
workers in its shrinking niches. Union unemployment agencies can
also form the basis for further expansions in similar directions. These
agencies could provide placement services for workers as well as skill
training and upgrading. The reflections of Laura Dresser and Joel
Rogers, quoted at the beginning of the Article, are applicable here:
The natural direction of taking these suggestions seriously
would be a labor movement that was much more dependent on
its ties to friends outside its immediate ranks, more
accommodating and inclusive of diverse membership, and more
concerned in general with establishing itself as the conscience
and steward of the broader economy.312
308. FINE, supra note 305, at 73.
309. Id. at 92.
310. Id. at 232.
311. Id. at 234-36; ESTLUND, REGOVERNING, supra note 9, at 181-82.
312. Dresser & Rogers, supra note 38, at 289.
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CONCLUSION
EFCA-the most important labor law reform proposal in a
generation and the labor movement's central revitalization strategy-
sought to strengthen and reinvigorate the U.S. regulatory model of
labor law established by the NLRA. However, recent research and
experience suggests that regulatory approaches to resolving social
problems are being superseded by governance methods. Governance
methods move away from state-mandated and top-down substantive
prohibitions and coercive enforcement and, instead, elicit the
participation of regulated entities collaboratively, dynamically, and
reflexively. Rather than dictating behavior, governance approaches
also attempt to shape actors' behavior indirectly by molding their
incentives. This Article has taken a comparative perspective to derive
governance insights from the practice of the Ghent system. The
Ghent system helps unions solve three basic problems of increasing
union membership: the recognition problem, the free-rider problem,
and the adversarial problem. U.S. labor law attempts to resolve these
same dilemmas but with obvious inadequacy. Further, union-
determined and union-administered unemployment insurance is
efficient and establishes a positive-sum tradeoff between a form of
security in the labor market and a flexible workplace. In addition to
these positive insights, this Article has considered what policy lessons
can be learned from the Ghent system. Most ambitiously, the absence
of federal constraints in the Social Security Act opens up reform
possibilities at the state level that are currently absent at the federal
level. By recharging and building on Ghent-system principles and
domestic experience, labor unions can also do much to resolve central
dilemmas they confront without legislative change.
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